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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is composed of three journals examining the interfaces between 
the marketing variable of advertising and various aspects of the operations function of the 
enterprise, namely, (1) production cost [Chapter 2], (2) inventory control [Chapter 3], and 
(3) service cost learning [Chapter 4]. The first journal identified the optimum advertising 
allocation policy over time in the presence of a quadratic convex/concave production cost 
function when the advertising response function is concave using a modified Vidale-
Wolfe model. Through analytical proofs and numerical simulations, the results indicated 
the potential superiority of a pulsation policy in the presence of concavity in the 
advertising response function only if the production cost function is convex; otherwise, 
the uniform policy would be optimal. The study is seen as applicable to frequently 
purchased products in the maturity stage of their life cycles of dominant firms in their 
industries practicing a zero-inventory policy in a just-in-time environment. 
The research objective pertaining to the second journal was to study how a firm 
would adapt optimum ordered quantity/production lot size and optimum advertising 
expenditure in response to changes in its own parameters, rival's parameters, or 
parameters that are common to all firms in a symmetric duopoly/oligopoly market. This 
was accomplished by developing comparative statics (sensitivity analysis) of a symmetric 
competitive inventory model with advertising-dependent demand based on a market share 
iii 
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attraction model. Both optimum advertising expenditure and ordered quantity were found 
to be sensitive to changes in marketing and operations parameters. The robustness of the 
symmetric comparative statics was assessed by using data from the brewing industry in 
the US that represents an asymmetric oligopoly. The empirical analysis indicated that the 
theoretical results obtained for a symmetric oligopoly remained valid for an oligopoly 
where each firm had a market share less than 50% and the market shares were further 
apart from one another. The study is thought to be applicable to low-priced frequently 
purchased consumer items in competitive mature markets. 
In the third journal, the original Bass model for new products was modified to 
incorporate advertising and customers' disadoption to characterize the optimum 
advertising policy over time for subscriber service innovations where service cost follows 
a learning curve. After characterizing the optimal policy for a general diffusion model, 
the results pertaining to a specific diffusion model for which advertising affects the 
coefficient of innovation were reported. On the empirical side, four alternative diffusion 
models were estimated and their predictive powers, using a one-step-ahead forecasting 
procedure, were compared. Empirical research findings suggest that the specific diffusion 
model considered in this study is not only of theoretical appeal, but also of notable 
empirical relevance. Taken together, the analytical and empirical findings argue in favor 
of advertising more heavily during the early stage of the diffusion process of the new 
subscriber service innovation and including a related message that would predominantly 
target innovators. 
V 
Furthermore, it might be inappropriate to model the diffusion of subscriber 
services as if they were durable goods. The study is thought to be applicable to service 
innovations that are made available to customers periodically at a subscription fee. 
Typical examples include, but are not limited to, cable TV, health clubs, pest control, and 
the internet. 
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This dissertation adopts the two definitions shown below provided by Stevenson 
(2008), and Kotler and Keller (2009). "Operations Management is an area of business 
concerned with the production of quality goods and services, and involves the 
responsibility of ensuring that business operations are efficient and effective". 
"Marketing Management is a business discipline which is focused on the practical 
applications of marketing techniques and the management of a firm's marketing 
resources and activities". Obviously, both sides recognize the importance of the 
interface from a managerial standpoint. The above definitions imply that while the 
objective of marketing is to create customer demand, operations management focuses 
on the supply and fulfillment of that demand. Therefore, one would expect to see 
operations and marketing to be intimately connected in many business organizations. 
When the two areas are in conflict, one often sees a mismatch in demand and supply, 
leading to production inefficiencies and unsatisfied customers (Ho and Tang, 2004). 
When they are working in harmony, one frequently sees an improved firm 
competitiveness and profits (Hausman, Montgomery and Roth, 2002). 
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Traditionally, operations and marketing are considered as two distinct, basic 
functions of an organization (Stevenson, 2008). Shapiro (1977) and Karmarkar and Lele 
(2004) note the conflicting nature among the two functions because of their horizontal 
separation. While operations has the objective to achieve economies of scale with 
centralized manufacturing, marketing and sales, on the other hand, focus on satisfying the 
demand of geographically disbursed customers. In achieving the common objectives of 
the enterprise, a conflict between these two separate entities occurs because their 
missions and reward systems are often different. While manufacturing aims at cost 
minimization, marketing aims at satisfying the needs and wants of customers. Operations/ 
marketing interfaces, causes of potential conflicts, and strategies for the integration of the 
two functions are discussed next. 
Operations/Marketing Interfaces, 
Conflicts and Integration 
Shapiro (1977) lists eight problem areas of "necessary cooperation but potential 
conflict" between production and marketing. They are (1) capacity planning and long-
range sales forecasting, (2) production scheduling and short-range sales forecasting, (3) 
delivery and physical distribution, (4) quality assurance, (5) breadth of production line, 
(6) cost control, (7) new-product introduction, and (8) adjunct services, e.g., spare parts 
inventory, support, installation, and repair. Montgomery and Hausman (1986) cite the 
following as being the most important interfaces between the two functions: (1) strategy, 
(2) forecasting, (3) the order delivery cycle, (4) product line, (5) quality, and (6) customer 
service. It is interesting to note that all these issues are also listed by Shapiro (1977), with 
the exception of business strategy. To highlight the strategy interface, Montgomery and 
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Hausman (1986) mention that some companies have coupled a low cost manufacturing 
strategy with a highly differentiated, high cost marketing strategy which creates entry 
barriers for competitors. In this case, the low cost manufacturing strategy enables the 
company to keep close to competitors in cost, while offering expensive marketing 
alternatives in order to have considerable value in the market place. In this context, 
Karmarkar (1996), Karmarkar and Lele (1989, 2004), and O'Leary-Kelly and Flores 
(2002) consider the interface between operations and marketing as a legitimate research 
domain. 
Achieving integration between manufacturing and marketing to resolve conflict 
could be achieved through pursuing a hybrid of three pure strategies: (i) concession (the 
conflicting parties make a concession by giving up their goals), (ii) compromise (the 
conflicting parties make a compromise by lowering their goal level), and (iii) intervention 
(a third party makes an intervention by identifying the intervention driver and weakening 
the conflict driver) (Omurgonulsen and Surucu, 2008). Typical examples of courses of 
action pertaining to each of the strategies mentioned above are (1) Manufacturing and 
marketing managers should understand each other better to facilitate close coupling 
between these functions. Cross-functional training, work experience, and rotating 
production and marketing people within the factory can substantially enhance 
understanding and cooperation (Montgomery and Hausman, 1986); (2) In organizing for 
new product development, many companies are moving to a team approach where R&D, 
manufacturing and marketing are all presented through a product's development and 
market introduction (Montgomery and Hausman, 1986); and (3) Top management should 
decide about its priorities in policy making, whether it is going to be manufacturing or 
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marketing-oriented. That is to say, if on-time delivery is determined as a priority, then the 
manufacturing department has to emphasize high inventory and bear this burden 
(Shapiro, 1977). 
This dissertation considers the interface and integration between operations and 
marketing, focusing specifically on decision-making from the view point of management 
science/operations research. In this regard, as in Eliashberg and Steinberg (1993) and 
Celikbas, Shanthikumar and Swaminathan (1999), the integration of the studied two 
functions focuses on their coordination using a centralized approach. According to such 
an approach, decisions such as production quantity/ordered quantity and advertising 
expenditure are jointly determined by operations and marketing with the objective of 
maximizing the total performance of the firm as a whole. 
Significance and Importance of Study 
One of the first attempts to address Operations-Marketing joint decision-making 
is presented by Whitin (1955), who provides extensions of two very basic inventory 
models which model staple merchandise and style goods, respectively. The models 
Whitin (1955) proposed incorporate both lot-size analysis and demand functions which 
are controlled via price by the decision maker. Since then, several authors have 
conducted research aiming at coordinating production/procurement and marketing 
decisions. Eliashberg and Steinberg (1993), Parente (1998), Yano and Gilbert (2004), and 
Chan et al. (2004) provide lucid reviews of the literature on the subject. While several 
models integrating the operations and the pricing functions have been published, there is 
a dearth of published models integrating the operations and the advertising functions. 
Notable examples that are relevant to the scope and purposes of this dissertation include 
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the studies of Subramanyam and Kumaraswamy (1981), Lee and Rosenblatt (1986), 
Urban (1992), Goyal and Gunasekaran (1995) and Pal, Bhunia and Mukherjee (2005). 
Subramanyam and Kumaraswamy (1981) consider an inventory model that 
incorporates price, advertising, economies of scale, and the receipt of defective items. A 
shortcoming of their model is the restrictive treatment of defective items. The models 
developed by Lee and Rosenblatt (1986) have subsequently addressed this problem and 
identified different scenarios for dealing with defective items. Goyal and Gunasekran 
(1995) develop an integrated production-inventory-price-advertising for deteriorating 
items to determine the production quantity and economic order quantity. Pal, Bhunia and 
Mukherjee (2005) introduce a deterministic inventory model for which the demand rate is 
dependent upon selling price, advertising and display stock level in a showroom/shop 
with the objective of maximizing average profits. The above four reviewed models 
consider the effect of the number of times advertised (advertising frequency) on demand, 
but do not model the relationship between advertising expenditure on demand explicitly. 
The above issue is taken up in the model articulated by Urban (1992) who investigates a 
finite replenishment inventory model in which the demand of an item is a deterministic 
function of price and advertising expenditure. The formulated models by Urban (1992) 
also incorporate learning effects and the possibility of defective items in the production 
process to determine the optimal lot size, price mark-up and advertising expenditure 
simultaneously. 
According to the Statistical Abstracts of the United States, total advertising 
expenditure in the US has grown from 187 billion dollars in 1997 to 279 billion dollars in 
2007. At the individual level of the firm, it was reported that in 2007, the largest 
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advertiser (Proctor & Gamble) spent more than five billion dollars on advertising 
($5,230,100,000 to be exact) while the 100th largest advertiser (Walgreen Co.) spent 
$355,400,000 (Advertising Age). Since a firm's marketing effort considerably relies on 
advertising, often requiring commitment of significant amount of resources, investigating 
better ways of spending such huge amounts of funds would undoubtedly be fruitful. 
Having established that advertising is an important element in a firm's marketing 
efforts, to which significant amounts of resources are usually committed, and a scarcity 
of models integrating the operations and advertising functions, how to determine the 
optimum advertising policy that works in harmony with various operations management 
decisions that will be studied in this research becomes an important issue to both 
academicians and practitioners alike. 
Objectives, Organization and Contribution of Study 
This dissertation responds to a call made by Eliashberg and Steinberg (1993, p. 
876) seventeen years ago who mention "Looking over the diversity of marketing-
production models available in the literature, we observe that the most common decision 
variable from the marketing side has been price (static or dynamic), and the most 
common decision variable from the production side has been order quantity or production 
rate. Future research should consider other marketing decision variables such as sales 
promotion and advertising expenditure, as well as decision variables corresponding to the 
timing of introduction of new products and their level of quality." This dissertation aims 
at partially filling a gap existing in the literature by examining the interfaces between the 
operations and advertising functions. 
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This research work is written in a three-journal format. Reviews of the literature 
pertaining to the three journals are included in the ensuing chapters. The first journal 
(Chapter 2) investigates the impact of production cost on advertising strategy in a 
monopolistic market. For a given advertising budget, the objective is to identify the 
optimum advertising allocation policy over time in the presence of a quadratic convex/ 
concave production cost function when the advertising response function is basically 
concave, using a modified Vidale-Wolfe model (1957) articulated by Little (1979). To 
the current author's knowledge, the study represents, for the first time in the literature, an 
attempt that aims at examining the impact of production cost on the advertising strategy 
of the firm. The study is thought to be applicable to low priced, frequently purchased 
consumer items. 
The second journal (Chapter 3) focuses on the development of a symmetric 
competitive inventory model with advertising-dependent demand. As in the study of 
Mesak (2003), the research employs a market share attraction model for which the 
attraction function of a competitor depends upon its own advertising effort. The objective 
of this research is to study how a firm would adapt optimum ordered quantity/production 
lot size and optimum advertising expenditure in response to changes in its own 
parameters, rival parameters, or the parameters that are common to all firms in a 
symmetric duopoly/oligopoly market. In this regard, the parameters are classified into 
two categories: operations parameters and marketing parameters. Operations parameters 
include ordering/setup costs, holding cost per unit of the product per unit time, and 
product unit cost. Marketing parameters include the parameters associated with the 
advertising attraction function for each firm, and market potential that is common to all 
8 
firms. To the best knowledge of the author, this is the first work in the literature that aims 
at deriving and assessing the robustness of comparative statics (sensitivity analysis) of a 
symmetric competitive inventory model with advertising-dependent demand. The study is 
thought to be applicable to low priced, frequently purchased consumer items. 
In the third journal (Chapter 4), the original Bass model (1969) is modified to 
incorporate advertising and customers' disadoption and used to determine the optimum 
advertising policy over time for subscriber service innovations where service cost follows 
a learning curve. To the current author's knowledge, this study represents the first 
attempt in the literature made to characterize and validate the optimal advertising 
trajectory for new subscriber services over time in the presence of service cost learning 
and customers' disadoption. The study is thought to be applicable to service innovations 
that are made available to customers periodically at a subscription fee. Typical examples 
include, but are not limited to, cable TV, health clubs, pest control, and the internet. 
Chapter 5 offers an overview of the findings of the three studies integrating the 
advertising function with different aspects of operations management followed by the 
limitations, and directions for future research pertaining to each journal. To improve the 
readability of different chapters, derivation of related key formulas, proofs of all results 
and propositions, and supplementary materials are relegated to separate appendices 
located at the end of the dissertation, followed by a list of references to all chapters. 
CHAPTER 2 
IMPACT OF PRODUCTION COST ON THE ALLOCATION 
OF THE ADVERTISING BUDGET OVER TIME IN A 
JUST-IN-TIME ENVIRONMENT OF 
ZERO-INVENTORY POLICY 
Introduction 
The objective of marketing is to create customer demand while operations 
management focuses on the supply and fulfillment of that demand. A conflict between 
these two areas may lead to production inefficiencies and unsatisfied customers (Ho and 
Tang, 2004). A firm's marketing effort that considerably relies on advertising often 
requires a commitment of a significant amount of resources. Therefore, the issue of 
whether it is best to adopt a pulsation policy of advertising or one of even-spending that 
costs the same is of significant interest to both academicians and practitioners. While the 
superiority of pulsation policies in a monopolistic market have been examined by a few 
authors (Feinberg, 1992; Hahn and Hyun, 1991; Mesak and Darrat, 1992; Mesak and 
Ellis, 2009), none of them considered the effect of production cost on the advertising 
strategy of the firm. To the best knowledge of the author, the study reported herein is the 




It is demonstrated in this study that, in the presence of a convex quadratic 
production cost function, a pulsation policy of advertising could be superior to its even-
spending counterpart for a concave advertising response function or when the advertising 
budget lies in the concave region of an S-shaped advertising response function. The 
above results are novel and different from previous research findings in the literature 
such as those by Sasieni (1971) for a concave advertising response function and others by 
Mahajan and Muller (1986) for an S-shaped advertising response function. These authors 
have not considered the production cost function in their models. Since this research lies 
at the interface between the marketing and operations functions, review of relevant 
marketing literature is introduced first, followed by what is related to the operations 
literature. 
Review of Related Marketing Literature 
Several research works have been published relevant to the optimal allocation of a 
given advertising budget over time. Sasieni (1971) in his pioneering article has shown 
that with decreasing marginal returns to advertising spending (concave advertising 
response function), a uniform advertising policy is superior to other policies of the same 
cost in the long run. However, empirical evidence suggests that a pulsing advertising 
policy could be superior to uniform spending over time (Wells and Chnisky, 1965; 
Ackoff and Emshoff, 1975; Rao and Miller, 1975; Eastlack and Rao, 1986). Due to the 
contradiction between theoretical and empirical findings, few models have been 
published with the purpose of substantiating advertising pulsation. Notable studies in this 
respect in monopolistic markets are briefly reviewed below. 
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Mahajan and Muller (1986) and Sasieni (1989) found that for an S-shaped 
advertising response function, some form of pulsing is superior to the uniform advertising 
policy provided that average advertising spending over the planning horizon is less than 
the advertising rate at which the tangent drawn from the origin meets the advertising 
response function. Mesak (1985) derived the conditions under which an advertising 
pulsing policy can be superior to a uniform advertising policy for both stationary and 
non-stationary markets. Using Haley's (1978) model, Simon (1982) and Mesak (1992) 
found that an advertising pulsing policy can be optimal under either a constrained or 
unconstrained advertising budget. Mesak and Darrat (1992) compared five alternative 
advertising policies analytically using a modified Vidale-Wolfe model and considered the 
impact of the shape of the advertising response function on optimality. They found that 
for a linear or concave advertising response function, a policy of uniform spending was 
optimal, while for a convex response function, pulsing advertising policy provided the 
best performance. Analyzing the effect of different costs on the optimal advertising 
policy, Hahn and Hyun (1991) found that a pulsation policy is optimal when the ratio of 
pulsation costs to fixed advertising costs is sufficiently small. Feinberg (1992) 
mathematically illustrated that a pulsation policy can be optimal in presence of an S-
shaped response function through the use of an exponential filtering mechanism. In a 
later study, Feinberg (2001) used optimal control theory to analyze a flexible class of S-
shaped response functions and showed that under certain conditions non-constant 
advertising paths may be optimal. Alternative theories have also been proposed. 
Bronnenberg (1998) derives pulsing in the context of a monopolist facing a Markovian 
sales-response function. Naik et al. (1998) consider copy wear out as a source of pulsing. 
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In a recent work, Mesak and Ellis (2009) analytically showed that if the product of a 
concave market potential function and the linear or concave advertising response function 
is convex in advertising, an advertising pulsing policy is superior to its uniform 
counterpart for the same advertising spending. These results indicate a general agreement 
among researchers that the shape of the advertising response function is an influential 
factor in deciding whether a uniform advertising policy is superior (or inferior) to its 
pulsation counterparts. In this regard, empirical studies related to the shape of the 
advertising response function provide overwhelming support to a concave response 
function (e.g. Simon and Arndt, 1980), but a limited support to an S-shaped response 
function (e.g. Rao and Miller, 1975). 
Review of Related Operations Literature 
In this subsection, a review related to the production cost function and zero-
inventory production relevant to the scope and the purposes of the paper is presented. 
Production researchers have observed that by assigning production to the source 
with the lowest unit cost until its capacity is fulfilled and then proceeding to the next 
cheapest source results in a convex production cost function which is also supported by 
empirical evidence (Eliashberg and Steinberg, 1993). In another research work, 
Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987) cited production and economics literature that employed 
a convex quadratic cost function. The authors showed that if the capital inputs are fixed, 
the production cost function can take the form of (1/K) Q2, where K is a constant and Q is 
the output. Hax and Candea (1984), however, offer that concave costs become an issue in 
situations involving setup (change-over) changes and economies of scale in the 
production process. 
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With the advent of JIT, the goal of zero-inventory production has stimulated great 
interest among researchers (Hall, 1983). Bielecki and Kumar (1988) developed an 
analytical model to show the optimality of zero-inventory policy, even for an unreliable 
manufacturing system when the demand rate was constant. Chan et al. (2002a; 2002b) 
examined, for piecewise linear ordering cost (representing many less-than truckload 
shipments) the effectiveness of a zero-inventory-ordering policy (ZIO), a policy in which 
an order is placed only when the retailer's inventory levels drop to zero while the supplier 
does not hold any stock. These research works indicate the importance of zero-inventory 
policy for both academic and practical purposes. 
In this study a modification of the original Vidale-Wolfe model (1957) is 
introduced for which the advertising response function can be either linear, concave or S-
shaped. However, unlike previous studies, this investigation considers the impact of the 
shape of the production cost function on the profit and the advertising policy of the firm 
in a just-in-time environment of zero-inventory policy. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The second section outlines the 
theoretical model. Then a comparison of alternative pulsation policies is presented in the 
third section. The fourth section presents numerical results as obtained by simulation of 
the proposed model. The fifth section summarizes and concludes the study. 
The Model 
The model described in this section can be applied to a business that sells a single 
frequently purchased item of low level consumer involvement in a monopolistic market, 
where the firm's marketing efforts are mostly limited to advertising. A monopolistic 
environment can be approximated in a condition where a firm dominates the market 
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while facing competition from many small firms who are too small to influence the 
market in a noticeable manner. Campbell's soup in North America, Heinz ketchup in the 
United Kingdom, and Wrigley chewing gum in Norway are examples of such a 
monopolistic market (Lazich, 2005). The assumptions made to develop this model are as 
follows: 
(a) The advertising rate (advertising amplitude) is constant over a given period of 
time, and may take on one of two distinct levels in a cyclic fashion. 
(b) The advertising budget for each cycle and the cycle length are determined 
exogenously and they are the same for each cycle. 
(c) The aggregate sales response to advertising is deterministic. 
(d) Sale of a product are strictly influenced by advertising. 
(e) Production is equal to sales as no inventory is maintained. 
(f) Production cost is a quadratic function of sales revenue. 
(g) Operating costs other than those related to production and advertising are 
proportional to sales revenue. 
Threshold effects of advertising were not considered due to their negligible role 
for frequently purchased items in mature markets (Vakratsas et al. 2004). 
Figure 2.1 provides a schematic illustration of three alternative forms of practical 
pulsation policies and the firm has to choose among three alternative policies: (a) 
Uniform Advertising Policy (UAP), in which the firm advertises at a constant level 
throughout (JC/ = xi), where xj and X2 indicate two different levels of advertising intensity, 
(b) Advertising Pulsing and Maintenance Policy (APMP), in which the firm alternates 
between a high level of advertising xj that lasts for a time period tj, followed by a lower 
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level X2, usually a maintenance level lasting for a duration of (T-ti), where T is the length 
of each cycle, and (c) Advertising Pulsing Policy (APP), in which the firm alternates 
between high and zero levels of advertising. The relationship between x; and X2 and 
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Figure 2.1. Different Forms of Advertising Pulsation Policies: (a) Uniform 
Advertising Policy (UAP), (b) Advertising Pulsing and Maintenance 
Policy (APMP), and (c) Advertising Pulsing Policy (APP). 
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Through laboratory study (Wells and Chnisky, 1965) and field experiments 
(Ackoff and Emshoff, 1975; Rao and Miller, 1975), it has been shown that an advertising 
pulsing and advertising pulsing/maintenance policy can be superior to the uniform 
advertising policy. These studies, and others, justify that the relatively narrow pulsation 
policy set considered above is not only of theoretical interest but also of practical 
relevance. Although the three studied pulsation policies are not by any means exhaustive, 
the inferiority of the uniform strategy implies the superiority of pulsing in general. The 
study is concerned with the long-term, steady-state response. Hauser and Wernerfelt 
(1989) assert that such a focus is most appropriate for strategic advertising decisions. The 
proposed model is constructed using Vidale and Wolfe model, and therefore, it is 
introduced in the ensuing subsection. 
Dynamic Advertising Response Model 
The Vidale and Wolfe model (1957) is one of the earliest and most intensively 
analyzed mathematical models of dynamic advertising response (e.g. Sasieni, 1971; 
Mahajan and Muller, 1986). According to this model, the instantaneous change in the 
sales rate is given by the following first-order linear differential equation: 
— = bx(m-S)-aS , (2.1) 
dt 
where S is the sales rate ($/unit time); x is the advertising rate ($/unit time); b is the 
advertising effectiveness parameter; m is the market potential or saturation sales, and a is 
the decay constant. The steady state advertising response S(x) is derived through setting 
dS/dt = 0, and solving Equation (2.1) for S to obtain: 
S W - - = ^ . (2.2) 
a+bx 
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The linear advertising response function for the Vidale-Wolfe model is given by f(x) = 
bx, and the market potential, m are constant. Little (1979) proposed a modified version of 
the Vidale-Wolfe model for which f(x) takes a power function of the form f{x) = 
bx , where b and Sare positive constants. Thus,f(x) becomes linear in x (f"(x) = 0) for S 
= 1, concave in x (f"{x) < 0 as a sufficient condition) for 0 < S < 1, and convex in x 
(/""(•*)> 0 as a sufficient condition) for 8> 1 (see also Figure 2.2). Sasieni (1989) used 
an S-shaped advertising response function of the form f(x) = be x. This function is 
convex over the range 0 < x < x, and concave for x > xt. x, = £ corresponds to the point at 
which the tangent drawn from the origin meets f(x) (see also Figure 2.3). This paper 
employs the modified version of Equation (2.1) for which the advertising response 
function can be linear, concave, or S-shaped. Turner and Wiginton (1976) and Mesak and 
Darrat (1992), among others, provide empirical evidence showing that the modified 













Figure 2.2. Different Shapes of Advertising Response Function 
By using the more general form for advertising response function in Equation 






a(x) = a + f(x), 






Figure 2.3. Details of an S-shaped Advertising Response Function 
The steady state sales rate (2.5) is concave if f(x) is linear or concave, while it is 
S-shaped if f(x) is convex. The decay constant, a, in (2.4) and (2.5) reflects the effect of 
advertising from the competition. Gopalakrishna and Chatterjee (1992) argued that for a 
firm with dominant market share and competing against a fringe of many small suppliers, 
each too small to influence the market, parameter a could be regarded as a constant 
quantity. 
Selecting a Performance Measure 
An appropriate performance measure is needed to compare the effectiveness of 
the alternative advertising policies. Mesak and Ellis (2009) quoted Feinberg (1988) about 
the advantages and disadvantages of several performance measures, two of which are 
relevant to the scope of this research. They are: (i) the discounted profit over the infinite 
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planning horizon that is sensitive to the initial sales level, and (ii) the average 
undiscounted profit over the infinite planning horizon that treats the profit made sooner 
as equal to the profit made later. Park and Hahn (1991) argued in favor of the second 
measure as it is independent of arbitrary initial conditions and its weakness is 
substantially mitigated due to the periodic nature of the advertising policies over time. 
Mesak (1992) showed that the second measure serves as a plausible approximation of the 
first one when the discount rate is small. Consequently, in this research, the second 
performance measure is employed. 
Sales Response to Advertising Pulsation 
Considering the general advertising pulsation policy for which 0 < X2 < xj (see 
Figure 2.4), the time axis is divided into equal similar cycles of duration T, in which 
advertising is at a high level xi, over a duration of time t\, and at a low level X2 over a 
duration of time (T-ti). The first cycle starts at t = 0 at which the initial sales is So, the 
sales rate grows to M at t] following the sales growth curve gi(t) while advertising is kept 
at its higher level. Afterwards, as the advertising level is decreased, the sales rate decays 
along the curve g2(t) until T and the cycle repeats with new initial conditions. It is shown 
in Appendix A (following Mesak and Ellis, 2009) that the system eventually reaches a 
quasi-steady state for which the steady state cycle starts and ends with the same level of 
sales rate as shown in Figure 2.4. These levels are unique and independent of the initial 
sales rate. Also, it is shown in Appendix A that for an infinite planning horizon, the long 
run average sales rate of a firm is equal to the average sales rate over the steady state 
cycle. Therefore, the average profit per unit time at the steady state, PRO, in response to a 










Figure 2.4. Sales Response to Advertising at the Steady-state Cycle 
Referring to Figure 2.4, the following quadratic production cost function is 
considered in the analysis: 
qi(t) = vgi(t) + —gf(t);i= 1,2. 
K 
(2.6) 
The above production cost function is composed of two terms. The first term is 
linear in the sales rate, measured in dollars per unit time, whereas the second term is 
quadratic in the same. The quantity v is a positive constant fraction seen to represent the 
ratio of the linear production cost component to sales revenue and K is another constant 
conceived to represent the firm's process efficiency (Eliashberg and Steinberg, 1987). 
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The quadratic production cost Function (2.6) is convex for K > 0 and concave for K < 0. 
The situation of a convex production cost function for which K > 0 is analyzed first. 
Considering the steady state cycle, the expressions for average sales revenue per 
unit time (R), the average production cost per unit time (PC), and the related average 
profit per unit time (PRO) are given by Expressions (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9), respectively. 





PC = vR + 
KT 




The first term in (2.8) is designated by PCX, whereas its second term is designated 
by PC2. Combining Equations (2.7) and (2.8) and introducing y, with a given average 
rate of advertising spending x assumed to have been determined exogenously, net profit 
per unit time is given by 
PRO = 
1 T A xr, 
Vo 





where ^is a fraction less than 1, given by y= 1 - e, and e > v > 0 represents the ratio of 
costs (other than those related to the nonlinear production cost and the advertising 
expenditure, such as the linear production cost and the physical distribution cost) to sales 
revenue which is assumed to be constant (Nicholson, 1983). 
It is also shown in Appendix A that Expression (2.7) takes the following form: 
T 
S(x[)t[+S(x2)(T-t[) + {S(x,)-S(x2)} 
r 1 1 l ( l - e - g ' " ) ( l - g ^
( r - ' ' ) ) ' 
V a2 a\J 
[i _e~(a\'\+a2(T-t]) \ (2.10) 
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fS{x2) 5(x)
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" I / 
a, a, 
where 
5fx/j = mf(x,)/(a +f(xj)); S(x2) = mf(x2)/(a +f(x2)); 
(Xi = a +f(xi); a2 = a +f(x2). 
Therefore, the net profit per unit time is given by (from Equation 2.9) 
PRO = yR-PC2-x. 
(2.11) 
(2.12) 
Comparison of Alternative Pulsation Policies 
In this section, the notion of dominance among different classes within the 
pulsation group of policies is introduced. As in Mahajan and Muller (1986) and Mesak 
and Darrat (1992), an advertising policy c; dominates another Cj that costs the same if 
when the firm employs policy c„ the average profit per unit of time is larger than that 
under policy Cj. A class of policies Q dominates a class of policies Cj if for any policy in 
Cj there exists a dominating policy in Cj. 
Consider a given average advertising budget rate x per unit time in a cycle of 
duration of T for all three advertising pulsation policies (namely, UAP, APMP, and APP), 
then we must have for each policy 
xjt, + x2(T - U) = xT, (2.13) 
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where x; and X2 are the high and low levels of advertising respectively, while t\ and (T-ti) 
are their related durations. These policies can be compared by conceiving them as policy 
sets, each characterized by a certain value of a policy parameter A. 
The policy parameter A (0 < A < 1) is defined as X2 - Ax, such that different 
advertising policies can be characterized in terms of A in the following manner: UAP is 
characterized by A = 1 (Figure 2.1a), APMP is characterized by 0 < A < 1 (Figure 2.1b), 
and APP is characterized by A = 0 (Figure 2.1c). Thus, for any given value of A, the high 
advertising level xi can be uniquely determined from (2.13) by replacing X2 by Ax. Hence, 
the UAP set contains only one policy element for which xi = xi = x. On the other hand, 
the APMP set contains a number of policy elements given by the Cartesian product (t\ x 
T x A), while the APP set contains a number of policy elements given by the Cartesian 
product (t\ x T). Based on expressions (2.10) - (2.12), we are in a position to introduce 
one result and one main proposition of which the proofs are provided in Appendix B. 
Result 1: 
For an Advertising Pulsing Policy (APP), 
_. , d(PRO) 
Sign of 
dtx 






From the above result and Figures 2.2 and 2.3, the following observations are made: 
(i) The sign of \f(x) - xf(x)] is positive for a concave advertising response function 
(see Figure 2.2), 
(ii) The sign of \f(x) - xf(x)] is negative for advertising budgets lying within the 
convex portion of an S-shaped advertising response function, the range of which 
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is determined by x = 0 and the advertising budget, xt, given by the tangent drawn 
from the origin to meet that function (see Figure 2.3), 
(iii) The sign of \f(x) - xf(x)] is positive for the concave portion of an S-shaped 
advertising function determined by advertising budgets in excess of x, (see Figure 
2.3), 
(iv) It is observed from (2.2) that the maximum value that S(x) could take for a finite 
value of x is less than m. Therefore, if a solution of the equation y= 2S(x)IK does 
not exist (yA72 > m), the sign of [y- 2S(x)/K] is always positive, and 
(v) If a solution of the equation y= 2S(x)/K does exist (yK/2 < m), the solution would 
be unique at a value xs > 0. In this case, the sign of [y- 2S(x)/K] is positive for 
advertising budgets x < xs and the sign of [y- 2S(x)/K] is negative for x > xs. 
Result 1 implies that if the sign of Expression (2.14) is negative, then APP 
dominates UAP as there will be at least one APP policy for which ti is smaller but close 
enough to T for which PRO is larger than the only unique UAP counterpart that costs the 
same. Based on Result 1, Proposition 1 is introduced for which the proof is found in 
Appendix B. 
Proposition 1: 
For a firm of a convex quadratic production cost function, if a solution to the equation y= 
2S(x)/K exists at xs > 0 
(i) In the presence of a concave advertising response function, APP and APMP dominate 
UAP for all advertising budgets x > xs. 
(ii) In the presence of an S-shaped advertising response function, APP and APMP 
dominate UAP for all advertising budgets x > Max {x,, xs}. 
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The results depicted in Proposition 1 are in contradiction to previous research 
findings reported in the literature. The result of Proposition l(i) is inconsistent with the 
findings of Sasieni (1971) who did not consider the production cost function in the 
modeling effort and asserted the optimality of UAP for a concave advertising response 
function. Similarly, the result of Proposition l(ii) is inconsistent with the findings of 
Mahajan and Muller (1986) that did not consider the production cost function in their 
modeling effort and asserted the optimality of UAP for advertising budgets that lie in the 
concave portion of an S-shaped advertising response function. 
In order to demonstrate that a quadratic convex production cost function is central 
to the potential superiority of a pulsation policy (APMP or APP) under a concave 
advertising response function, it is shown below that such possibility cannot materialize 
for a linear production cost function (K = oo) or a concave one (K < 0). For that purpose, 
two results are introduced first followed by an additional proposition. 
Result 2: 
Considering the performance measure R and for a concave advertising response 
function, advertising pulsing/maintenance policy (APMP) dominates advertising pulsing 
policy (APP) but is dominated by uniform advertising policy (UAP). 
The proof of the above result is found in Appendix B (see also Mesak and Darrat, 
1992). 
Result 3: 
For a concave advertising response function, the absolute value of the quadratic 
term of the production cost function (PC2) attains its maximum value at a value of the 
policy parameter X = 1 (or UAP). 
27 
The author was not able to prove analytically the above result. The validity of 
such a result, however, was examined by simulating the sensitivity of Expression (2.11), 
for the various values of the relevant parameters. It is concluded, without a formal proof, 
that for all values tried for the parameters the statement of the above results remained 
unchallenged. Using simulation to prove propositions is not an uncommon practice in the 
relevant literature. Notable examples are found in the studies of Mahajan and Muller 
(1986, p. 96) and Mesak (1992, p. 319). Based on results 2 and 3, Proposition 2 is 
introduced for which the proof is found in Appendix B. 
Proposition 2: 
For a firm of a concave quadratic production cost function, APMP dominates 
APP but is dominated by UAP for a concave advertising response function. 
Proposition 2 broadens the scope of applicability of known results in the literature 
(e.g. Sasieni, 1971; Mesak and Darrat, 1992) to the situation of a concave quadratic 
production cost function that has not been examined before in the literature. More 
importantly, Proposition 2 attributes the potential superiority of a pulsation policy in the 
presence of concavity in the advertising response function predominantly to the 
convexity of the production cost function (Proposition 1). It is also shown in the next 
numerical section of the study that the findings of Proposition 2 appear applicable for 
advertising budgets lying in the concave portion of an S-shaped function. 
A Numerical Investigation 
The main purpose of the numerical investigation of this section are (1) to provide 
illustrative examples in support of the statements of Propositions 1 and 2 for both 
concave and S-shaped response functions in the presence of a convex quadratic 
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production cost functions, and (2) to report the results of a simulation study that is aimed 
at validating the statement depicted in Result 3. The employed values of model 
parameters have been influenced a great deal by the results of the empirical estimation of 
modified versions of the Vidale-Wolfe model found in the studies of Mesak and Darrat 
(1992) and Mesak and Ellis (2009). The above two articles used the well-known Lydia 
Pinkham data, originally examined by Palda (1964), in the estimation of such models. 
Illustrative Examples 
For T = 0.50, t, = 0.25, y= 0.4, and K = 40,000, the modified Vidale-Wolfe model 
(2.3) of a concave advertising response function, f{x) - 0.0 IV* , takes the form 
dS Idt = (o.20 + 0.0lV;c)[S(jt) - S], and 
S(x) = (16,000) °- 0 1^X . - . 
0.2 + O.OIVJC 
Referring to Proposition 1, it can be shown that the solution of the equation y= 
2S(x)/K is given by xs = 400. Table 2.1 reports the quantities R, PC2, PROl, and PR02 as 
a function of the policy parameter X for two values of the advertising budgets x = 300 < xs 
and x = 500 > xs. Consistent with Proposition 1, optimal PROl occurs at a policy 
parameter X less than 1 for x = 500, whereas optimal PROl occurs at X = 1 for x = 300. 
Consistent with Results 2 and 3 together with Proposition 2, the optimal values of R, 
PC2, and PROl occur at X = 1. The above observations related to a concave advertising 
response function appear reproducible for advertising budgets lying in the concave 
portion of an S-shaped advertising response function as shown in Table 2.2. 
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aPROX = yR - PC2 - x (profit under a convex quadratic production cost function) 
bPR02 = yR + PC2 - x (profit under a concave quadratic production cost function) 
For T = 0.50, t, = 0.25, y= 0.4, and K = 40,000, the modified Vidale-Wolfe model 
(2.3) of an S-shaped advertising response function,/(x) = 0.48e"350/*, takes the form 
dS/df = (0.20 + 0.48e-350/j:)[S(ji) - S], and 
S(x) = (16,000) 
0.4&? -350 Ix 
0.20 + 0.48e -350/.t 
It can be shown that the solution of the equation y= 2S(x)/K is given by JC.S = 399.79. 
Furthermore, the considered S-shaped advertising response function is x, = 350 (see 
Figure 2.3). Table 2.2 reports the quantities R, PC2, PROX, and PR02 as a function of X 
for two values of the advertising budget x lying in the concave portion of the above S-
shaped advertising response function. They are xt = 350 < x = 370 < xs = 399.79 and x = 
430 > Max {xh xs] = 399.79. Again, consistent with Proposition 1, optimal PROX occurs 
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at a policy parameter X less than 1 for x = 430, whereas optimal PROl occurs at X = 1 for 
x = 370. Furthermore, the optimal values of R, PCI and PROl occur at X = 1. 















































































































aPROl = yR - PC2 - x (profit under a convex quadratic production cost function) 
bPR02 = yR + PC2 - x (profit under a concave quadratic production cost function) 
A Simulation Study 
In conducting the simulation study related to a concave advertising response 
function, different parameters were initialized at the following base values: m = 16,000, b 
= 0.01, 5= 0.50, x = 400, ti = 0.25, T= 0.50 and K = 40,000. Different pulsation policies 
were produced through the use of policy parameter X, and X = X2/X (for APP, X = 0; for 
APMP, 0 < X < 1; and for UAP, X = 1). Eleven different values of X were assumed 
ranging between 0 and 1 in increment of 0.1. Since K is basically a scaling parameter, 
only one value for it has been employed. The quadratic term of the production cost at the 
steady state cycle PC2 (Equation 2.11) was computed for each possible combination of X 
using different sets of values for the other parameters. In constructing such sets, only one 
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parameter at a time was allowed to vary over a certain range while the other parameters 
were kept at their base values shown above. The different ranges used for the parameters 
(including the base values) are as follows: 
m: 10,000 to 20,000 in increments of 1,000 (eleven values) 
a: 0.001, 0.010, 0.050, 0.100, 0.200, 0.250 (six values) 
b: 0.001, 0.005, 0.010, 0.015, 0.020 (five values) 
5. 0.1 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1 (ten values) 
x: 50 to 500 in increments of 50 (ten values) 
(J, t,)\ (0.2500, 0.0625), (0.2500, 0.1250), (0.2500, 0.1875), (0.5000, 0.1250), 
(0.5000, 0.2500), (0.5000, 0.3750), (1.0000, 0.2500), (1.0000, 0.5000), (1.0000, 
0.7500) (nine values) 
There were a total number of 605 computations performed for calculating PC2 
(55 different values for the parameters m through tj multiplied by 11 different values of 
X). For all the 55 relationships investigated between X and PC2, the largest absolute value 
of PC2 occurs at X = 1. Table 2.3 illustrates a sample of the relationship between X and 
PC2 for two advertising budgets and two combinations of (T, ti). 
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Table 2.3. Relationship between PC2 and A 

































































Table 2.3 also reveals that the relationship between the absolute value of PC2 and 
A. is monotonically increasing exactly like that relationship between R and A, depicted in 
Table 2.1. 
Conclusion 
The literature reveals a contradiction between the theoretical results and the 
empirical research findings on the issue whether a firm should advertise at a constant rate 
or in a cyclic fashion in order to maximize its performance. Sasieni (1971) in his 
theoretical analysis showed that under linear or concave advertising response function, a 
pulsation or cyclic advertising policy can never be superior to a uniform advertising 
policy in the long run when the total cost of both policies are the same. On the other 
hand, based on empirical findings, Ackoff and Emshoff (1975) and Eastlack and Rao 
(1986) concluded that an advertising pulsation policy is superior to a policy of uniform 
spending over time that costs the same. After reviewing more than one hundred empirical 
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studies, Simon and Arndt (1980) concluded that the shape of the advertising response 
function is mostly concave or linear. While a few research attempted to resolve the above 
said difference (e.g. Feinberg, 1992; Hahn and Hyun, 1991; Mesak, 1992; Mesak and 
Ellis, 2009), the proposed solutions have been always within the marketing domain. 
Unlike the above attempts, this study offers a resolution within the operations function of 
the enterprise. 
This paper attributes the potential superiority of pulsation in the presence of 
concavity in the advertising response function to the convexity of the production cost 
function and the advertising budget (Proposition 1). To substantiate the superiority of an 
advertising policy of pulsation, the convexity of the shape of the production cost function 
is envisioned to be a central requirement; otherwise, the uniform advertising policy 
becomes optimal (Results 2, 3 and Proposition 2). To that end, the theoretical and 
numerical analysis employ a dynamic advertising response model (modified Vidale-
Wolfe model) in a just-in-time environment of zero-inventory policy. 
Proposition 1, guided by the findings of Result 1, provides management with 
simple rules to assess the superiority of an advertising pulsation policy in the presence of 
a convex quadratic cost function for advertising budgets lying in the concavity region of 
the advertising response function. The implementation of such rules and their 
consequences has been illustrated by the results of a numerical investigation associated 
with the analyzed model in the fourth section (Tables 2.1 through 2.3). 
The results of the study are not confined to the employed model but are rather of 
general applicability. The results should be reproducible for other models that can be cast 
in the form of model (2.3). Little (1979) showed that several notable theoretical models 
34 
can be formulated in the context of (2.3), including the models of Gould (1970), Little 
(1975), and Nerlove and Arrow (1962). 
CHAPTER 3 
ON COMPARATIVE STATICS OF A SYMMETRIC 
COMPETITIVE INVENTORY MODEL WITH 
ADVERTISING - DEPENDENT DEMAND 
Introduction 
While inventory is considered one of the most important elements of the supply 
chain in contemporary operations management, advertising is considered one of the most 
important promotional tools of modern marketing management. This study focuses on the 
development of a symmetric competitive inventory model with advertising-dependent 
demand. The objective of this research is to study how a firm would adapt optimum 
ordered quantity/production lot size and optimum advertising expenditure in response to 
changes in any of its own parameters, rival parameters, or the parameters that are 
common to all firms in a symmetric duopoly/oligopoly market. By a symmetric 
oligopoly, it is meant that the firms are as similar as possible in all economic respects 
who compete non-cooperatively with each other for the same potential buyers in an 
industry producing a storable, homogeneous product (Mesak, 2003). With symmetric 
competition, all rivals are assumed to have the same production costs, to be able to 
acquire real promotion on the same terms, to charge the same fixed price and to face 
symmetric demand functions (Schemalensee, 1976). 
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As in the study of Mesak (2003) who has not explicitly considered inventory 
costs, this research employs a Nash equilibrium solution concept in conjunction with a 
market share attraction model for which the attraction function of a competitor depends 
upon its own advertising effort. Similar to the study of Min and Chen (1995) who have 
not explicitly considered advertising, each firm aims at maximizing its profit and 
ordering/setup as well as inventory holding costs which are assumed identical across 
firms in a situation for which all the assumptions of a traditional EOQ model hold. To the 
best knowledge of the author, this is the first work in the literature that attempts to derive 
and assess the robustness of sensitivity analysis (comparative statics) of a symmetric 
competitive inventory model with advertising-dependent demand (Here the two terms 
"sensitivity analysis," mainly adopted by operations research practitioners, and 
"comparative statics," mainly used by economists, are employed interchangeably to mean 
the same thing). The study is thought to be applicable to low priced, frequently purchased 
consumer items in the mature stage of their product life cycles. 
This paper demonstrates that previous comparative statics obtained by Mesak 
(2003) remain valid after the incorporation of inventory costs in the modeling effort. 
However, optimal advertising is found sensitive to changes in the operations parameters 
of the model associated with ordering and inventory holding costs that were not 
considered by Mesak (2003). On the other hand, the analysis reveals that comparative 
statics obtained under a cost minimization of an inventory model could be very different 
from their counterparts under a profit maximization framework that considers an 
advertising-dependent demand. Furthermore, the optimal ordered quantity appears to be 
sensitive to changes in the marketing parameters of the model associated with the market 
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share attraction function and the advertising cost function. Because the model developed 
herein is static in orientation, a literature review of dynamic oligopoly models that use 
differential games in their analyses is beyond the scope of this exploratory study. 
Interested readers are referred to Dockner et al. (2000) and Erickson (2009a, 2009b) for a 
review of related literature. 
Review of Related Marketing Literature 
Whitin (1955) was the first to integrate purchasing decisions and marketing by 
incorporating the effect of price on demand within the inventory model where the retailer 
has to decide both the price and order quantity optimally. The above article triggered 
numerous research with the objective of integrating price-dependent demand with 
inventory models or ordering policies (Abad, 1988, 1996; Lee, 1993; Arcelus, Shah, and 
Srinivasan, 2003; Ray, Gerchak, and Jewkes, 2005; Viswananthan and Wang, 2003). The 
price-dependent demand model was later extended by another stream of research to 
integrate the inventory model with advertising dependent demand (Subramanyam and 
Kumaraswamy, 1981; Urban, 1992; Khouja and Robbins, 2003; Sana and Chaudhuri, 
2008). 
The research works mentioned above strictly considered a single firm, and 
therefore, competition was beyond their scope. Game theory is considered an appropriate 
tool for analyzing events where multiple agents are involved in a decision process and 
their actions are interrelated (Fudenberg, and Tirole, 1991). There has been limited 
research within a static framework on advertising competition in a duopoly/oligopoly 
using the game-theory approach (Friedman, 1958; Mills, 1961; Gupta and Krishnan, 
1967; Mesak and Calloway, 1995, 1999; Mesak, 2003). The above research works, 
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however, have not considered inventory related costs in the modeling effort. Therefore, 
the current research contributes by investigating an inventory model with advertising-
dependent demand in a duopoly/oligopoly. 
Review of Related Operations Literature 
To meet customer demand, firms face conflicting pressure to keep inventories low 
enough to reduce the holding cost but high enough to reduce ordering and setup costs 
with the objective of minimizing the total cost of inventory (Stevenson, 2008). This is 
accomplished by determining the right quantity to be ordered. There are several models 
that are used for this purpose of which the economic order quantity model (EOQ), along 
with its different variations, have been studied intensively assuming a constant demand 
rate (Buzacott, 1975; Chandra and Bahner, 1985; Chung, 1989; Moon and Lee, 2000). 
Noting that demand for inventory items increases with time in the growth phase, and 
decreases in the decline phase, researchers have extended the EOQ model to include a 
demand pattern that follows a certain distribution or varies with time (Bose, Goswami, 
and Chaudhuri, 1995; Haneveld and Teunter, 1998; Chang and Dye, 1999; Moon and 
Giri, 2001; Moon, Giri, and Ko, 2005). 
However, all the research works mentioned above assume that the demand rate is 
determined exogenously and involve a single firm. Min and Chen (1995) extended the 
EOQ model to the case of a symmetric oligopoly consisting of several manufacturers 
who compete against each other for the same potential buyers assuming a constant 
demand rate. The above authors assume the availability of the options of investing to 
reduce the setup and inventory holding costs. The sensitivity analysis reported in the 
above theoretical paper was limited to studying the impact of increasing the number of 
39 
competitors on the ordering cost, the holding cost and the ordered quantity per order. The 
present research differs from previous works as it employs an EOQ model to a symmetric 
oligopoly for which the demand is dependent on advertising expenditures. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The second section outlines the 
theoretical model. The third section derives the sensitivity analysis for a monopoly and a 
symmetric duopoly. The fourth section estimates the market share attraction model using 
brewing industry data while the fifth section provides an empirical analysis to assess the 
robustness of comparative statics of the symmetric oligopoly. The sixth section 
summarizes and concludes the paper. Derivation of key formulas and mathematical 
proofs are reported in two separate Appendices (C and D). 
A Mathematical Model of Inventory and 
Advertising Competition 
Monopoly Model 
A profit function in a monopoly is introduced first in this section. Denoting the 
advertising expenditure of the firm by x, the demand D(x) as a function of advertising is 
expressed as follows: 
D(x)=mm_ jnfi/^ 
e + f(x) e + /3x 
where m is the market potential, f(x) is a concave attraction function such that f\x) > 0, 
f"{x) < 0 for x > 0, and e is a constant parameter. For the considered attraction power 
function, the /?and £are strictly positive parameters, and for a concave function, 0 < S< 
1. It is shown in Appendix A that Expression (3.1) represents the steady state sales 
response of a modified version of the well-known Vidale-Wolfe model (1957) articulated 
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by Little (1979). The parameter /? represents the relative effectiveness of the advertising 
effort of the firm while the shaping parameter £ represents the elasticity of the advertising 
effort of the firm. To justify the assumption of a concave advertising attraction function, 
researchers have argued that a firm should first advertise in places where it gets the most 
response for each dollar spent. As advertising expenditure increases, the firm would 
spend more in previous places and expand its effort to the next best place. This argument 
of diminishing return justifies the assumption of a concave advertising function (Kotler, 
1971; Simon and Arndt, 1980). Designating the unit price, the marginal cost, the 
advertising cost function, the quantity ordered, the ordering cost per order, the inventory 
holding cost per unit held per unit time, and fixed costs by P, MC, C{x), Q, C0, Ch, and F, 
respectively, and introducing y as the profit margin per unit sold (P - MC), the profit 
function, 7toi the firm takes the following form: 
7r = yD(x)-C(x)-Q-Ch-^C0-F. (3.2) 
It is also assumed that the advertising cost function is convex and of the form 
C(x) = dxe, where d and e are positive constants such that d > 0, and e > 1 (Piconni and 
Olson, 1978). For a convex function, C'(x)>0and C"(x)>0, for x > 0. Defining 
n = nI ym, for convenience of analysis, and replacing D(x) by Expression (3.1), the 
profit Function (3.2) takes the following form: 
C n = - / w 
e + f(x) 
1 
rQ 
C W _ _ ^ e _ ^ L . (3.3) 
ym 2ym ym 
The first-order optimality conditions require that the optimal advertising JC* > 0 
and optimal ordered quantity Q* > 0 satisfy the two equations: 
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M = 0,andfl = 0. (3.4) 
ox oQ 
Also, for a global maximum of profit, the second order sufficiency conditions of 
d2n . ,. . u u L a
2n . a2n . J a
2na2n 
optimahty require that both —^-and ——r- are negative and 
( 3 2 T T A2 
dxoQ 
is 
a*2 ae2 a*2 ae2 
positive (see Taha, 1992, p.718 for details). The detailed expressions of the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of optimality in conjunction with Expression (3.3) are found in 
Appendix C. The sensitivity analysis for a monopoly model is presented in the third 
section. 
Duopoly Model 
The model described in this section is an extension of the monopoly model 
introduced earlier and considers a market share attraction model in a duopoly market, 
with one advertising variable Xj. The market share of firm 1, D{x{), in a market of two 
competitors is expressed as follows: 
D(xl) =
 mf(X,) = „ m/'Xi s and D{x2) = m-D{x,), (3.5) 
where m is the market potential and /(A;,) and f(x2) are the attraction functions of firms 
1 and 2, respectively. All rivals are assumed to have concave advertising attraction 
function, such that /'(jcy)>0and /*(x ; )<0for Xj > 0. For all the attraction functions, 
the y^s and ds are strictly positive parameters, and for a concave function, 0 < S< 1, as 
in the monopoly model. It is shown in Appendix D that Expression (3.5) represent the 
steady state sales response of a modified version of Kimball's (1957) competitive 
advertising model articulated by Little (1979). Similar to the monopoly model, 
designating the unit price, the marginal cost, the advertising cost function, the ordered 
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quantity, the ordering cost per order, the inventory holding cost per unit held per unit 
time, and the fixed costs by Pj, MCj, C(xj), Qj, C0j, Cy, and F-} respectively, and 
introducing y as the profit margin per unit sold (Pj - MCj), the profit function, Kj of firm./ 
takes the form 
Q, D(xi) 
*J=rjD(Xj)-C(xj)—j-Chj—^Coj-FJ, 7 = 1 , 2 . (3.6) 
As in the monopoly model, it is also assumed that the advertising cost function is convex 
and of the form C(x]) = dp-', where dj and q are positive constants such that dj > 0, and 
£j > 1 (Piconni and Olson, 1978) with underlying properties, C'(xy)>0and C"(Xj)>0, 
for Xj > 0. Defining IT . = #. / y-m> f° r convenience of analysis, and substituting for D(XJ), 




f(x,) + f(x2) 
f(x2) 
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y2m 2y2m y2m 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
The analysis of this situation is based on Nash equilibrium solution concept of 
game theory. Researchers have widely used Nash equilibrium solution concept in an 
oligopoly (Mills, 1961; Mesak, 2003). The Nash equilibrium solution requires that no 
single rival unilaterally changes its advertising policy given the other rivals' optimal 
advertising policies. Since it is practically impossible for firms to monitor competitors' 
advertisement spending without time lags, and it takes time to change advertising 
budgets, a firm can expect a substantial time lag before any competitive reaction occurs. 
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This justifies the appropriateness of the Nash equilibrium solution concept 
(Schemalensee, 1976) and therefore is used in analyzing the model. 
The first-order optimality conditions for an interior solution (XJ* > 0 and Qj* > 0) 
implies that 
an. an, 
— ^ = 0 and—^- = 0, ; = 1 , 2 . (3.9) 
dxj dQj 
Also, to ensure that Expressions (3.9) indicate profit maximization, both the 
second-order derivatives 32n,./3;t2 and 32n, IdO] must be negative and 
J J J *"J *"-' 
a2n,a2n. ( a2n ^2 
i J J must be positive for all j . A complete derivation of the first and 
dx/ dQ/ [dxjdQj 
second order conditions of optimality for firms 1 and 2 are presented in Appendix D. The 
following section provides a brief derivation of the sensitivity analysis for both the 
monopoly and duopoly cases. Details are found in Appendices C and D. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity Analysis for a Monopoly 
In this section, the impact of changes in each of the shift parameters y, fi, S, m, d, 
£, Cf,, C0, and e for a given firm on its optimal advertising expenditures x* and optimal 
ordered quantity Q* (self-sensitivity analysis) is derived theoretically. To study the 
sensitivity of x* and Q* to a change in one of the shift parameters 0, Equations (3.4) are 
partially differentiated with respect to 6 then equated to zero afterwards to obtain 
a2n dx a2n dQ a2n 
dx1 d0 dxdQ d0 dxdG ~ 
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and 
a2n dx d2ndQ a2n n 
dQdx 30 dQ2 d0 dQdd 
(3.10) 
Here, it is assumed that all second partial derivatives of n with respect to each of the 
equilibrium values x* and Q* together with each of the shift parameters #do exist and are 


















Designating the 2 x 2 square matrix of the second-order partial derivatives in (3.11) by 
matrix H, which is assumed to be non-singular, and therefore, its inverse exists, 










and the elements of matrix H are obtained by partially differentiating (3.3). Complete 
derivations of those elements are presented in Appendix C. Upon applying (3.12) for a 
monopoly of profit maximizing behavior, Proposition 1 is introduced with related terms 
defined as shown below (see Appendix C for a proof): 
ef C0 
a — {e+ffrQ2 
(positive term), (3.13) 
1 -
YQ 
(negative term), and (3.14) 
ym 
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A = —.—^r—°-r-a2 (positive term). (3.15) 
{e + f)rQ-
Proposition 1: 
For a monopoly 
(i) An increase in parameter ^should be responded to by an increase in both the 
equilibrium advertising and ordered quantity, 
(ii) An increase in parameter Ch should be responded to by a decrease in both the 
equilibrium advertising and ordered quantity, 
(iii) An increase in parameter C0 should be responded to by a decrease in the 
equilibrium advertising and an increase (decrease) in the equilibrium ordered 
quantity if A - a1 > (<)0. 
(iva) An increase in parameter /? should be responded to by an increase (decrease) 
in the equilibrium advertising if —-< (>) and an increase (decrease) 
yQ 2f-e 
in the equilibrium ordered quantity if —— < (>)-
yQ eA + a2(2f-e)' 
(ivb) An increase in parameter £ should be responded to by an increase (decrease) 
• u -,-u • J •• •* C„ , , 2{(e + / ) / £ + (<?-/)ln*} A in the equilibrium advertising if —- < (>) — and an 
yQ 2(e + f)/S + (e-2f)\nx 
increase (decrease) in the equilibrium ordered quantity if 
C ^ < ( > ) 2a
2{(e + f)/S+(e-f)lnx} yQ ' " ' 2a\e + f)/S+(e-2f-eA)lnx' 
(v) An increase in either of the parameters d or e should be responded to by a 
decrease in both the equilibrium advertising and ordered quantity. 
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(vi) An increase in parameter e should be responded to by an increase (decrease) 
in the equilibrium advertising if —-< (>) and an increase (decrease) 
YQ 2f-e 
in the equilibrium ordered quantity if —- < (>) T-, r. 
7Q eA + a2{2f-e) 
(vii) An increase in parameter m should be responded to by an increase in both the 
equilibrium advertising and ordered quantity. 
Part (i) of the above proposition suggests that as the advertising effectiveness 
increases, the firm should increase their advertising spending and ordered quantity to 
increase the profit. Part (ii) implies that as the inventory holding cost increases, the firm 
should reduce both advertising spending and ordered quantity to ensure optimal response. 
However, if the ordering cost increases as indicated in part (iii), a firm should always 
reduce the advertising spending. Though the direction of change in the ordered quantity 
will be an empirical question, the answer depends upon a combination of marketing and 
operations parameters together with the levels of the equilibrium advertising and ordered 
quantity themselves. Part (iva) and (ivb) imply that if either of the parameters associated 
with the advertising attraction function increases, the optimal response would be basically 
an empirical question, the answer of which would be governed by the related inequalities. 
On the other hand, if the parameters associated with the advertising cost functions change 
in such a way to increase advertising cost, part (v) indicates that optimality is insured by 
decreasing both advertising spending and ordered quantity. Similar to parts (iva) and 
(ivb), part (vi) suggests that if parameter e increases, optimal response would be an 
empirical question, the answer of which would be governed by the related inequalities. 
The situation associated with part (vii) argues that if the market potential increases, it 
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would be optimal for the firm to increase its advertising spending and ordered quantity to 
enhance its profitability. 
Sensitivity Analysis for a Duopoly 
This section provides a theoretical derivation of the impact of changes in each of 
the shift parameters, namely yp ftp &p m, dp ep Cy, Cop for a given rival j on its optimal 
advertising expenditures Xj* and optimal ordered quantity Qj* (self-sensitivity analysis) 
as well as on similar quantities related to the competitors (cross sensitivity analysis). In a 
symmetric duopoly, firms are as similar as possible in all economic respects that compete 
against each other for the same potential buyers in an industry producing a storable, 
homogeneous product. A symmetric competition also stipulates that rivals will have the 
same production cost, may acquire real promotion on the same terms, charge the same 
fixed price and face symmetric demand functions (Schemalensee, 1976). Therefore, all 
comparable shift parameters are assumed to be equal and firms are assumed to have equal 
market shares. 
To study the sensitivity of each Xj* and Qj*, j - 1, 2; to a change in one of the 
model parameters 0, Equations (3.9) are partially differentiated with respect to 0 and 
then equated to zero to obtain 
32n, dx{ 3
2n, 3g, 32n, dx2 3
2n, dQ2 3
2n, _ 
3x,2 30 3JC,3<2, dO dxfix2 dd dxfiQ2 d0 dxfid ~ ' 
32n, 3x, | 8
2n, 9Q, a2n, dx2 | a
2n, dQ2 ^ 3
2n, 
dQfa dO + 8<22 dO + dQxdx2 dd
 + dQ,dQ2 dd dQ$0 ~ ' 
32n2 dx, | d
2n2 ag, 9
2n2 dx2 9
2n2 ag2 | 8
2n2 _ 








-+ • + +- • + • dQ2dx, dO dQ2dQx dO dQ2dx2 dO dQl dO dQ2dO 
0 . (3.16) 
Here, it is also assumed that all second partial derivatives of IT; with respect to 
each of the equilibrium values xf and Qj* together with each of the shift parameters Odo 
















































3(223x, 3<223g, 3g23x2 
Designating the 4 x 4 square matrix of the second-order partial derivatives in (3.17) by 



















The derivations of the elements of matrix H and all other terms related to 
Expression (3.18) are shown in Appendix D. It is also assumed that matrix H is 
nonsingular, so that its inverse does exist. The model also assumes that the market 
potential m is constant. Gruca, Kumar, and Sudharshan (1992) asserted that negative 
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semi-definiteness of the square matrix H is essential in ensuring uniqueness of the Nash 
equilibrium solution of the system of Equation (3.9). A complete proof of the negative 
semi-definiteness of matrix H is provided in Appendix D. 
Based on the solution of Equation (3.18) for a symmetric competitive EOQ 
inventory model with advertising-dependent demand, Proposition 2 is introduced with 
related terms defined as shown below (see Appendix D for a proof): 
f C 
a = V (positive term), (3.19) 
4f fQ 
C ~\ C" 
1 - (negative term), and (3.20) 
yQ] ym 
bC , 
A, = j-a2 (positive term). (3.21) 
YQ 
Proposition 2: 
For a symmetric duopoly 
(i) An increase in the parameters y fi, or Sof a rival should be responded to by an 
increase in the equilibrium advertising and ordered quantity of its own but a 
decrease in the equilibrium advertising and ordered quantity of its competitor, 
(ii) An increase in either of the parameters dor e of a. rival should be responded to 
by a decrease in the equilibrium advertising and ordered quantity of its own 
but an increase in the equilibrium advertising and ordered quantity of its 
competitor, 
(iii) An increase in parameter Ch of a rival should be responded to by a decrease in 
the equilibrium advertising and ordered quantity of its own but an increase in 




(iv) An increase in parameter C0 of a rival should be responded to by a decrease in 
the equilibrium advertising and an increase (decrease) in the equilibrium 
ordered quantity if A , -2a 2 >(<)0 of its own but an increase in the 
equilibrium advertising and ordered quantity of its competitor. 
(v) An increase in parameter m should be responded to by an increase in the 
equilibrium advertising and ordered quantity of both rivals. 
Part (i) of the above proposition rejects the idea that improvements in the stated 
parameters of a firm would favor reducing its advertising spending and ordered quantity 
to achieve the same sales level as before and a simultaneous reduction in total inventory 
costs, as it would be suboptimal. The firm instead would make more profit by spending 
more on advertising and increasing its ordered quantity. Part (ii) implies that if the 
parameters associated with the advertising cost function increase, an optimal response for 
the firm is to decrease its advertising spending and ordered quantity to mitigate the 
impact on its advertising cost and reduce its total inventory costs. However, the rival 
should take advantage of the situation by increasing its advertising expenditure and 
ordered quantity to make more profit. Part (iii) indicates that if the inventory holding cost 
of a firm increases, the firm should decrease its advertising expenditure and ordered 
quantity for an optimal response. But it would be suboptimal for the rival not to take 
advantage of the situation by increasing its advertising expenditure and ordered quantity. 
However, if the ordering cost of a firm increases, as dictated in part (iv), the firm should 
respond by decreasing the advertising expenditure; but the optimal response in the 
ordered quantity will be dictated by other parameters. On the other hand, the rival's 
optimal policy will be to take advantage of the situation by increasing both the 
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advertising expenditure and ordered quantity. The case associated with part (v) argues 
that if the market size increases, it would be optimal for all competitors to increase their 
advertising spending and ordered quantity to increase their profit as supported by the 
empirical findings (Metwally, 1992). The optimal response for this case is dissimilar to 
the situations associated with parts (i) through (iv) of the proposition. 
It is advantageous at this point to mention that parts (i), (ii) and (v) of Proposition 
2 for a duopoly are consistent with the theoretical findings of Mesak (2003) who 
considered a symmetric oligopoly for which the number of competitors n > 2. Mesak 
(2003), however, has not considered inventory related costs in his modeling effort. It is 
conjectured here that the results depicted in Proposition 2 are generalized to an oligopoly 
of n competitors. The theoretical findings reported in the above proposition are derived 
under ideal symmetric conditions that almost never materialize in practice. The following 
two sections attempt to assess the robustness of the theoretical sensitivity results to 
deviations from these ideal conditions through examining the applicability of these 
results to a practical oligopoly setting. The next section estimates a market share 
attraction model in an oligopoly using actual data related to the United States brewing 
industry. The estimated parameters are then used in a following section to determine the 
elements of Expression (3.18), upon obtaining the equilibrium advertising and ordered 
quantity levels using Equation (3.9). Robustness is assessed by comparing the empirical 
sensitivity results obtained from applying Expression (3.18) with their theoretical 
counterparts highlighted in Proposition 2. 
52 
Estimation of a Market Share Attraction Model 
The market share of firm j , MSHRj, in a market of TV competitors is expressed in 
Equation (3.22). 
MSHRj = _ y >' = ' > , (3.22) 
where all parameters are defined in the second section. The market share attraction model 
for an oligopoly as given in Equation (3.22) is empirically estimated using actual data 
related to the United States brewing industry. Nelson (2005) provides firm specific sales 
and advertising data for Anheuser-Busch (firm 1), SAB-Miller (firm 2), Coors (firm 3) 
and an aggregate of other small brewers (firm 4). The same data set has been recently 
analyzed, but in a different research context, by Erickson (2009a). The current study 
employed data for the years 1994 through 2003. The raw data indicated an asymmetric 
nature of all the firms and yet each of them had a market share less than 50% for each 
year and further apart from one another making the data set suitable for examining the 
robustness of the theoretical sensitivity analysis associated with the symmetric 
competition as derived in the third section. Prior to analysis, the advertising expense data 
were converted to 1989 dollars. Defining, 
5/, - cases in millions sold by firm j in year t, 
MSHRp - market share of firm,/ in year t and 
Xjt - advertising in 1989 million dollars in year t for firm/ 
The quantity Xj, is determined assuming to be the year (1989 in this study) at 
which consumer price index = 100 and then defining 
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Advertising deflator in year t = 
US population in year /(18 years and older) 
US population in year t0 (18 years and older) 
x consumer price index in year t. 
Accordingly, advertising expenditure in year t for firm j , xp, expressed in to dollars is 
given by: 
Advertising in million dollars in year t for firm j / Advertising deflator in year t. 
Descriptive statistics of the data are shown in Table 3.1. The table indicates that all 
variables MSHRj and Xj assume considerable variability during the studied period. 
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Also defining, MSHR, = (MSHR]t. MSHR2t. MSHR3t. MSHR4l)'
/4, 
MSHR*, = In (MSHR/MSHR,), 
x, = (xh. x2t. x3t. x4t)
1/4, and 
x], = In (xj/x,) 
the market share attraction model (3.22) is estimated by ordinary least-squares regression 
after log-centering the data for each period t as defined above (Cooper and Nakanishi, 
1998). The regression equation used to estimate the parameters of the market share 
attraction model is given by: 
MSHR'jt -a{+ a'2d2 + a'^ + a'4d4 + Sx*jt + e*jt, 
where dj is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for an observation related to firmy 
and 0 otherwise; a'j = cCj - a] forj = 2, 3, 4 (noting that bj - e
a' for ally); 8{ = 8\ = Si 
= S} = 84) are parameters to be estimated; and e"jt is an error term overy in period t. 
Table 3.2 lists the parameter estimates and their statistical significance level (p-
values) as obtained from linear regression. All parameters are statistically different from 
zero at better than the 0.05 level. The estimated model has face validity as the value of S 
lies between 0 and 1 suggesting a concave advertising attraction function which is 
supported by the literature (Simon and Arndt, 1980; Friedman, 1983). Finally, the large 
value of R indicates that the model fits the data fairly well. 
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Table 3.2. Regression Estimates of the Parameters Related to the Market Share 
Attraction Model 
Coefficient estimate of S 
Coefficient estimate of a\ 
Coefficient estimate of a'2 
Coefficient estimate of a\ 
Coefficient estimate of a\ 









Note: ̂ -values are in parentheses. 
Derivation of Empirical Comparative Statics 
The empirical comparative statics are derived by following the steps of the 
procedure described below: 
(i) All parameters associated with the market share attraction model (3.22) are 
estimated using information from Table 3.2. 
(ii) The parameters m, y}, advertising cost function C(xj), ordering cost COJ; holding 
cost Chj, and the order quantity Qj variable are estimated. The above quantities are 
associated with the profit Functions (3.7 and 3.8), extended to four firms as shown 
below: 
J 4 1 -
C < -
rjQj. 
^ - T ^ H 2 , - ^ , 7=1 ,2 ,3 ,4 . 
/=i 
The methods used to compute the quantities mentioned in step (ii) are illustrated 
in details later in this section. 
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— ^ = 0 and 
Yjtn 
an. _ / (x ;) c(, chj 
dQj ^fWrjQl tym 
0. 
Nash equilibrium x* and 2* is determined through numerically solving the 
system of eight simultaneous nonlinear equations given above. 
The elements of the Heissian matrix H8xs are computed which are similar to 
Expression (3.17), but extended to four firms. It should be noted that elements Hjk 
and Hkj need not be equal as these two terms belong to different rivals. 
The entries of the post-multiplier column vector of Expression (3.18) extended to 
four firms is computed as follows: 
}2TT Jj 2-tJi 
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3fiy3Q 
0 for all i 7^7. 
a2n, c; a2n, cM 
( k ) ^ ^ - = — ^ - a n d J-- hj-dxjdm Yjm2 dQjdm ly^m1 
(vi) Expression (3.18) extended to four firms is applied in conjunction with the results 
obtained from steps (iv) and (v) to assess the signs of comparative statics. 
For the current study, it is assumed for simplicity that the advertising cost 
function is linear, i.e., C(xj) = Xj, thus, C^= 1 and C"= 0 for all./. The linearity of the 
advertising cost function in advertising spending has some empirical support (see 
Schmalensee, 1970, p. 232-233). After applying the above procedure, the results shown 
below were obtained. 
From Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the following estimates were obtained: 








Operationalizing y]t as the gross profit per case sold for firm j in year t expressed 
in 1989 dollars, this quantity was calculated for firms 1, 2 and 3 during the period 1994 -
2003 upon reviewing the annual published financial statements of the three companies. 
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Fory = 1,2 and 3, y was computed as the average value of that quantity of firmy over the 
studied ten years. For firm 4, yt was estimated as the average value of y, y and y^. The 
obtained results are shown below: 
y, = 2.384, y = 2.621, y3 = 1.939, ^ = 2.315. 
Operationalizing Chjt as the holding cost per year expressed in 1989 dollars, this quantity 
for j = 1, 2 and 3 in a given year t was computed as the product of the cost of case sold 
and the interest rate of 3 - months Treasury bill computed on annual basis (Irvine, 1981; 
Ramyantsev and Netessine, 2007). Following a similar procedure as that employed in 
computing the y's, the obtained results are shown below: 
Cft/ = 0.24, Ch2 = 0.21, C« = 0.19, Ch4 = 0.2l. 
Operationalizing the ordered quantities Qj, (in million of cases) as twice the 
number of cases sold for firm j divided by the annual inventory turnover in year t, Qj, and 
Qs, were computed as defined. Because inventory turnover figures were not available for 
the second and fourth companies, industry turnovers reported in different annual editions 
of Almanac of Business and Industrial Financial Ratios were used instead to calculate Q2, 
and Q4,. The calculations are conducted assuming that the assumptions of the economic 
order quantity (EOQ) model are applicable. The descriptive statics of variables Qj, are 
depicted in Table 3.1. 
Finally, the inverse optimization process (Troutt, 1995) was applied to provide 
estimates for C0j, the per order cost of firm j . In this regard, the expression of the EOQ 
model for each firm j and year t given byQjt = JTDjtCnjt IChjl , where Djt = St.MSHRjt, 
was used to obtain C0jt. Upon averaging these quantities over the period 1994 - 2003, the 
estimates (in millions of 1989 dollars) are given below: 
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Co/ = 4.85, Co2 = 3.6, Co3=\21, Co4 = 3.39. 
Based on the above set of parameter estimates, Nash equilibrium advertising spending 
and optimal order quantity is obtained for all competitor according to step (iii) and is 
given below upon using MATLAB Version 6.5, Release 13: 
x =130.4319, x2= 95.5651. x* =39.1818, £=84.7214, 
Ql = 227.873, Q2 =139.8786, £3 =61.0179, g4 =136.1713. 
Following step (iv), the Heissian matrix H and its inverse H"1 are obtained using the same 






























































































































Finally, upon applying Expression (3.18) extended to four competitors, the obtained 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CN — m m 
O O oo oo 
m m — CN 
NO V) « NO 
ON CN — CN 






































































—̂ 1 — " 
vo 






ro ro ro 
<3i 
O) O) O) O) 
















































































































CN " * oo m 
oo cn o m 
c«i CN — oo 
Q i ^b <^ ^b 
ro ro ro ro 










































m NO r^ m 
• * CN r^ <N 
O O m o 
o o o o 
& d> -3- d> 
CN 
cn 






o o o 
r̂  




























^̂  • * 













^ ^ ^ ^i 
ro <~& <~0 <~& 
- f c— ^ o i ^c^, ^r 
O) O) O) O) 
ro ro ro (TD 
63 
The table shows, without exception, that all of the 168 empirical comparative 
statics obtained possess signs that are consistent with their theoretical symmetric 
counterparts depicted in Proposition 2. Such a central finding is alarming provided that, 
for each year, the raw data summarized in Table 3.1 indicate that the market shares of 
competing firms were dispersed apart from each other. 
Conclusion 
This study involved theoretical derivation of comparative statics of a symmetric 
competitive inventory model with advertising-dependent demand associated with a 
market share attraction model of advertising competition. The validity and robustness of 
the theoretical model is empirically examined using the brewing industry data in the US 
for which competition is asymmetric. The results demonstrated remarkable consistency 
between the theoretical and empirical comparative statics. The validation procedure 
required estimation of the parameters of the market share attraction model (fourth 
section), which are used afterwards to operationalize Expression (3.18) extended to an 
oligopoly of four competitors. Then the signs of the empirical sensitivity results (fifth 
section) are compared with their theoretical counterparts involving symmetric 
competition in a duopoly (Proposition 2). The main conclusion drawn from the findings 
of the present study is of significant managerial appeal to both marketing practitioners 
and production managers. For an oligopolistic market that is not dominated by a single 
rival (largest market share is less than 50%), a firm would adjust its advertising spending 
and ordered quantity in response to changes in its own or competitor parameters in a 
manner consistent with the comparative statics reported in the proposition. Although the 
theoretical model was developed for a symmetric competition for simplicity, the 
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validation of the results using the empirical data from an asymmetric oligopolistic 
competition suggests that relaxing the assumption of symmetry for theoretical model 
development will make the analysis more complex without yielding much new insight. 
The estimated value of S being less than 1 indicated a concave attraction function that 
favors constant advertising spending over time for all rivals (Mesak, 1999). While the 
comparative statics suggest how firms should respond to changes in model parameters, 
marketing practitioners as well as production/purchasing managers need to be aware of 
circumstances that may affect the model parameters. Notable examples are provided 
below. 
The profit margin of a competitor, y}, could change due to the adoption of new 
technology, improved efficiency in production/operations, purchasing policies, etc. The 
parameters associated with the attraction function, namely (3and <Sof a competitor, can be 
affected in two distinct manners as identified by Little (1979). In the event a firm changes 
its advertising copy with the objective to communicate the same information better or 
provide a better demonstration of their product, parameter /? is likely to be affected. 
However, if the goal is to reposition the product and appeal to a different group of 
consumers, parameter 8is likely to change. As mentioned in Mesak (2003), the rival's 
cost of advertising includes, in addition to the expenses of advertising messages, the 
opportunity cost of not utilizing such expenses in the rival's enterprise as well as the cost 
of obtaining the necessary funds to finance these expenses (Monahan, 1987). A change in 
the opportunity cost (perhaps due to changes in the rival's performance) could affect the 
d parameter. A change in the cost of funds (perhaps due to changes in the perceived risk 
of the rival by lenders) could influence the parameter e. Stevenson (2008) mentions that 
65 
holding or carrying costs include opportunity costs associated with having funds which 
could be used elsewhere tied up in inventory, insurance, taxes (in some states), 
depreciation, obsolescence, deterioration, spoilage, pilferage, breakage, and warehouse 
costs (heat, light, rent, security). A change in one or more of the above cost items would 
result in a change of the C0 parameter. Also, the above reference mentions that ordering 
costs include determining how much is needed, preparing invoices, shipping costs, 
inspecting goods upon arrival for quality and quantity, and moving the goods to 
temporary storage. A change in one or more of the above cost items would cause a 
change in the C/, parameter. Finally, the market potential m can be affected by factors like 
population, average income per capita, and other factors that may influence the demand 
for the product (Lilien et al., 1992). 
CHAPTER 4 
OPTIMUM ADVERTISING POLICY OVER TIME 
FOR SUBSCRIBER SERVICE INNOVATIONS IN 
THE PRESENCE OF SERVICE COST LEARNING 
AND CUSTOMERS' DISADOPTION 
Introduction 
In the early 1900's, less than one third of the labor force in the United States was 
employed by the service sector. By 1950, the service industry employed almost half of 
the workforce. With the introduction of new services over the past three decades, such as 
cable TV, cell phones, internet, online banking/retailing, satellite radio, health clubs, etc., 
the service sector in the US currently employs most of the workforce, responsible for 
more than 80% of the gross domestic product, and growing considerably faster than the 
goods sector (US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 2003; 
Zeithaml and Bitner, 2003). 
Despite the growing role of the service sector and the declining role of the 
manufacturing sector in most Western societies (Metters and Marucheck, 2007), 
published research on the diffusion of new subscriber consumer service innovations 
remains scanty relative to the literature on new consumer durable (product) innovations 
(see Mahajan et al., 2000 and Meade and Islam, 2006 for further details). The 
importance of studying subscriber consumer services becomes self-evident in light of the 
fact that, at present, almost every US household is involved in one way or another, in 
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these services. The current study is applicable to service innovations that are made 
available through service providers to prospective consumers periodically at a 
subscription fee. 
The modeling of diffusion of services provides unique challenges as stated by 
Libaietal. (2009a, p. 163): 
A considerable influence on the market growth of a new service is 
customer attrition. Beginning with the initial stages of penetration into a 
market, there are customers who leave the service: They switch to 
competitors or, alternatively, leave the category. In this sense, the growth 
of a new service is similar to a leaking bucket - there is an inward flow of 
adopters and a concurrent outward flow of customers who leave. 
Several researchers have modeled the diffusion of services as if they were durable 
goods, such as cell phones (Krishnan, Bass, and Kumar, 2000), landline phones (Jain, 
Mahajan, and Muller, 1991), and online banking (Hogan, Lemon, and Libai, 2003). In the 
literature, researchers often focused on cases when an exiting customer is acquired by a 
competitor (churning). However, customers can also disadopt and leave the service 
category altogether (Hogan et al., 2003). This is evidenced from the empirical research by 
Reichheld and Schefter (2000) and Meuter et al. (2005). Thus, attrition consists of both 
churning and disadopting customers and the attrition rate is the sum of the churn and 
disadoption rate (Libai et al., 2009a). 
As mentioned above, this research is motivated by the recognition of the inherent 
differences between goods and services. The basic differences between services and 
goods are attributed to the assertion that services are intangible (cannot be seen, handled, 
smelled, etc.), heterogeneous (customized making its mass production difficult), 
produced and consumed simultaneously (lack of transportability), and perishable (unsold 
service on time is lost) (Zeithmal and Bitner, 2003). The above mentioned differences 
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between goods and services led Rust and Chung (2006, p.575) in their review article on 
service and relationships to advocate the use of optimal control theory as a viable tool to 
optimally manage the dynamic relationship with customers. 
While optimal control theory has been applied within the context of diffusion of 
service innovations in a monopoly by a few researchers (e.g. Fruchter and Rao, 2001; 
Mesak and Darrat, 2002), none of them considered the effect of disadoption (termination 
of service subscription) on the optimal advertising policy of the firm. 
Recent studies show that customer attrition, for which disadoption is a significant 
component, can have a considerable effect on growing markets (Hogan et al., 2003; 
Gupta et al., 2004; Libai et al., 2009a). To the best knowledge of the author, the study 
reported herein is the first attempt in the literature to investigate the impact of customers' 
disadoption on the optimal advertising policy of new subscriber services. 
It is demonstrated in this paper that the advertising policy of the firm, in the 
presence of customers' disadoption, could be very different from the same when 
disadoption is ignored. The modeling effort employed in this study considers the learning 
cost curve and the discount rate. Subscriber services for which advertising is a main 
source of revenue instead of being an instrument for generating subscriptions such as 
newspapers, magazines and contemporary electronic media (internet websites) are 
beyond the scope of the present study. Interested readers are referred to Kumar and Sethi 
(2009) for a recent review of related literature. 
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Review of Related Marketing Literature 
Notable examples of diffusion models for subscriber service innovations that have 
not considered marketing mix variables include Dodds (1973) who studied the diffusion 
of cable TV, Kim et al. (1995) who studied the diffusion of cell phones, Rai et al. (1998) 
who studied the diffusion of the internet and more recently Libai et al. (2009a, b) who 
studied cell phones, cable TV and online banking. 
Subscriber services' studies that considered nonlinear pricing in the presence of 
network demand externalities (the benefits to a consumer increases with the number of 
other subscribers) include the works of Rohlfs (1974), Rabenau and Stahl (1974), and 
Dhebar and Oren (1985, 1986), and those that did not deal with demand externalities 
include the works of Maskin and Riley (1984), Wilson (1993), Fruchter and Rao (2001), 
and Danaher (2002). A nonlinear pricing includes an ongoing fee just to join (adopt) the 
service and usage fee such that heavy users pay more than light users. 
Jain et al. (1999) examined the question of how the pricing of a complementary 
product such as the handset influences the pricing of a metered service, phone calls. They 
concluded that under certain cost conditions and competition in a two-period universe, 
the price of the handset decreases over time, whereas that of the calls is non-decreasing. 
Danaher et al. (2001) developed a model of first time sales and subscription for two 
generations of cellular phones in a European country. The authors found that, although 
the time path of estimated price elasticity in a multiple-generation setting closely follows 
those for a single generation, the interaction in price response across generations was 
significant. 
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Mesak and Darrat (2002) developed and optimized diffusion systems for new 
subscriber consumer services. Each proposed system is composed of two differential 
equations, one for the retailer adoption process and another for the consumer adoption 
process that incorporate price. In a later empirical study (Mesak and Darrat, 2003), the 
authors concluded that a diffusion system with a two-way interaction between the two 
adoption processes performed slightly better than a single diffusion model of consumers 
that incorporates price. 
The above literature review reveals that there are only two published studies that 
consider the disadoption rate in the diffusion of subscriber services. The first study (Libai 
et al., 2009a) does not consider any marketing variable in the modeling effort. The 
second study (Fruchter and Rao, 2001) considers price, but ignores service cost learning. 
The present paper considers both the disadoption rate and advertising in its modeling 
effort that also considers experience curves for subscriber services. 
Review of Related Operations Literature 
In this subsection a review related to the learning cost curves relevant to the scope 
and the purposes of the paper is presented. 
The organizational learning curve refers to the increases in productivity that are 
obtained as organizations gain production experience (Pati and Reis, 2007). Operations 
literature usually associates learning curve phenomena with continuous improvement and 
quality management in processes (Adler and Clark, 1991; Zangwill and Kantor, 1998). 
Wright (1936) observed that in the production of airplanes the hours required to 
manufacture a unit falls at a constant rate as the number of units produced rises. 
Organizational learning curves exhibiting this inverse log-linear relationship between 
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productivity improvements and cumulative experience have since been observed in a 
wide variety of industries (Argote and Epple, 1990; Conway and Schultz, 1959; 
Hirschmann, 1964; Yelle, 1979). As shown below, experience curves were found 
applicable in service operations. 
Darr et al. (1995) evaluated the learning curve effects in a chain of 36 pizza stores 
using data collected over a year and half. They found that experience gained through 
"learning by doing" led to significant reductions in unit cost. 
Goodale and Tunc (1998) explored the labor scheduling problems in service 
operations utilizing dynamic service rates based on the learning curve theory. They found 
that learning curve methodologies predominantly applied in manufacturing environments 
performed well in a customer contact environment with both part-time and full time 
workers. 
Chambers and Johnston (2000) applied the experience curve in two very different 
service organizations. The first case showed how an experience curve has been calculated 
at a macro (organization) level for British Airways over a 20 year period, including the 
time at which it was privatized. The second example showed an application over the first 
year of operation of a high-volume paperwork processing operation within a financial 
service organization. The authors concluded that their studies demonstrated that 
experience curves can be applied to a great effect in high volume service organizations. 
Boone et al. (2008) conducted an empirical study based on seven years of project 
data collected from an architectural engineering firm. The analysis showed professional 
service display learning curves. 
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In this study the marketing variable of advertising is incorporated into the 
diffusion model of services articulated by Libai et al. (2009a) that explicitly considers the 
disadoption rate. The related measure of performance that takes into account the cost 
learning curve is optimized afterwards using optimal control theory. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The second section outlines a 
general dynamic diffusion model for new subscriber service innovations, formulates the 
problem and presents the solution method. The third section characterizes the optimal 
advertising policy. The fourth section is empirical in orientation and aims at estimating 
and choosing among alternative proposed diffusion models. The last section summarizes 
and concludes the paper. To improve exposition, derivation of key formulas and proofs of 
all propositions are relegated to a separate Appendix (Appendix E). 
General Model Formulation and Solution Method 
Let us consider adoptions of a new subscriber service in a monopolistic market. A 
firm manipulates its advertising expenditure Ut (assumed to be bounded from above) at 
each time t over a fixed planning period T, 0 < t < T. The monopoly assumption may 
seem reasonable in situations in which the firm enjoys a patent protection, a proprietary 
technology, or a dominant market share. A general diffusion model is given by: 
dN/dt = N't = f(Nt, U,), N0>0 and fixed, (4.1) 
where, N, and N't represent the number of subscribers by time t and the subscription rate 
respectively. Equation (4.1) suggests that the concurrent subscription rate is related to the 
current number of subscribers and the current rate of the marketing variable. Function / 
is assumed to be twice differentiable with the following properties related to the 
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marketing variable where a subscript on a variable denotes partial differentiation with 
respect to that variable: 
/ > 0 ; / l / > 0 ; a n d / l / t / < 0 . (4.2) 
The inequalities (4.2) imply that the subscription rate is non-negative, decreases 
with an increase in the subscription charge, increases with an increase in advertising and 
is concave in the marketing variable (diminishing returns' phenomenon). 
A cost learning curve is introduced next by assuming that marginal costs, denoted 
by C, depend on the number of subscribers such that marginal costs decrease with 
increasing the number of subscribers (experience), 
C, = C(Nt), dC(N,)/dNt = C\Nt) < 0. (4.3) 
Note that marginal cost could be constant (C = 0). Ct is mainly a function of 
efforts related to service activation (e.g. installation) and account maintenance (e.g. 
billing, computer service space, and help provided by the firm). 
For a firm charging a fixed service fee rate P that aims to find the optimum 
trajectory Ut* to maximize the discounted profit stream over the planning period T, the 
problem is formulated as follows for a discount rate r > 0: Find trajectory Ut* to 
J \ 7 
Maximize [ (P - C(Nt ))Nt-E Q(U,) 
» sit 
e~"dt. (4.4) 
Subject to = f{Nt, Ut) and the initial number of subscribers 7V(0) > 0 is fixed and 
dt 
NT is free. 
In Expression (4.4), PNt represents the total revenue generated from subscribers 
Nt and C(N,) N, is the related total variable cost. E(dN/dt), as in Kim et al. (1995), stands 
for the cost associated with recruiting new subscribers (dN/dt), so that constant E 
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represents the average incremental cost per additional new subscriber. For example, 
cellular phone firms have been willing to pay high commissions to distributors and have 
often given away hardware (handsets) in exchange for contractual agreements with new 
subscribers. In Expression (4.4), Q(U,) is the advertising cost function assumed to be 
non-negative and convex with respect to its argument with the properties Q'> 0, Q"> 0 
(Piconni and Olson, 1978). As in earlier monopolistic models (Dockner and Jorgensen, 
1988a; Thompson and Teng, 1984; Kalish, 1985), no salvage value was assumed for the 
final number of subscribers at time T. Dockner and Jorgensen (1988b) assert that this 
assumption is particularly plausible when the firm is more concerned with its profit 
stream over the planning period than profit to be made after time T. This assumption also 
makes results for new subscriber services readily comparable with their counterparts 
related to new products. 
The optimal control problem (4.4) can be solved by applying Pontryagin's 
maximum principle optimization technique (Pontryagin, 1962). To apply the maximum 
principle, the current value Hamiltonian (Sethi and Thompson, 1981) takes the form 
shown below: 
Ht(Nt, U<) = (P- C(N,)) Nt -Q(Ut) +a - E)f(N„ Ut), (4.5) 
where A, is a costate variable that must satisfy the ensuing equation: 
f = rA-^-,A(T) = 0. (4.6) 
dt dN 
An economic interpretation of At is found in Sethi and Thompson (1981). Briefly, 
At, has the interpretation of a shadow price of the stock of subscribers Nt. In this paper, as 
in Dockner and Jorgensen (1988a), the considered admissible controls are twice 
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differentiable in t and satisfy Ut > 0 for all relevant t. (In what follows, the time argument 
is eliminated to minimize confusion and improve clarity). Confining the interest to 
admissible controls, the partial derivatives of the current value Hamiltonian with respect 
to U along the optimal trajectory, as in Feichtinger (1982), must satisfy the following 
condition for an interior solution for which 0<U<U<U: 
Hu=^- = 0. (4.7) 
ail 
where U and U are the lower and upper bounds of U, 
and #<,</= | ^ - < 0 . (4.8) 
oil 
The above second-order condition (Huu < 0) is one of several sufficiency 
conditions of optimality implying that the Hamiltonian H is jointly concave in the control 
variable U and the state variable TV (Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1977). If a sufficiency 
condition is violated (e.g. Huu > 0), the optimal advertising policy would be either the 
constant U or the constant U. By substituting into the Hamiltonian H, the constant that 
maximizes it would be chosen as Ut* (Teng and Thompson, 1985, p. 192) 
Optimal Advertising Policy for New Subscriber Services 
This section starts first by analyzing the situation of the general diffusion model 
(4.1) followed by an analysis related to specific diffusion models for subscriber services. 
Analysis of the General Diffusion Model 
Using Condition (4.7) in conjunction with Expressions (4.5), (4.6) and (4.8), it is 
shown in the Appendix that the first derivative of the optimal trajectory U* with respect 
to time t is uniquely determined by the following equation: 
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- ^ ^ j r = -T-(f*fu-fuNf)-fu{P-C-NC'}+rAfu. (4.9) 
dU dt fv 
The optimum advertising trajectory is difficult to characterize using the general 
Expression (4.9) because several terms are of opposite as well as ambiguous signs. 
Therefore, the expression will be analyzed in conjunction with specific plausible cases. 
On the basis of the general Expression (4.9), two propositions are introduced for which 
the proofs are found in Appendix E. 
Proposition 1: 
For a low interest rate such that advertising elasticity of demand is a non-
increasing function of penetration, optimal advertising is decreasing over time in the 
presence of a service cost learning curve. 
Proposition 1 implies from Expression (4.9) that when advertising elasticity of 
demand 
dU 
d f ^ U_ is non-increasing in penetration N, it would be sufficient for marginal 
revenue with respect to an additional subscriber, or d(PN)/dN, to be larger than 
marginal cost with respect to the same, or d(CN)/dN, for optimal advertising to be 
decreasing over time. Continuous improvement of the quality of subscriber services is the 
rule rather than the exception. For example, a provider for cable TV is inclined to modify 
the service (cable channels) to meet consumer needs better (Gatignon and Robertson, 
1985). Such continuous improvement in quality could be very well responsible for the 
decline in advertising elasticity. Declining advertising elasticities over the product life 
cycle have been observed in the empirical studies of Parsons (1975), Arora (1979), and 
Mesak and Clark (1998). 
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Proposition 2: 
For a large interest rate, optimal advertising increases over time in the presence of 
a service cost learning curve. 
Proposition 2 implies that a myopic service provider interested in maximizing 
short-term profit because of high uncertainty about the market (Bayus, 1994) would be 
inclined to increase advertising over time. The proposition asserts that the relationship 
between advertising and penetration would be approximately linear. The slope of this 
linear relationship is the interest rate r. Since Expression (4.9) does not clearly 
characterize the trajectory of the marketing variable Ut*, several diffusion models with 
specified functional forms are analyzed next. 
Analysis of Specific Diffusion Models 
The original Bass model (1969) as modified by Libai et al. (2009a) to represent 
the diffusion of new subscriber services in continuous time that explicitly considers 
customers'disadoption is given by Equation (4.10): 
^ = P[M-N] + ̂ =^HM-N,]-8N, , (4.10) 
at M 
where Nt is the number of subscribers by time t, M is the market potential, p is the 
coefficient of innovation, q is the coefficient of imitation, and S is the disadoption rate. 
The above authors assumed that only those who did not disadopt spread positive word-of-
mouth communications about the service. Therefore, the level of word-of-mouth 
promotion by retained customers remained the same (q), but its effective impact was 
reduced due to disadoption from [qN,]/M to [q(l-d)Nt]/M. As disadopters return to the 
market potential, the remaining market potential is M - Nt and is not affected by the 
disadoption process (Libai et al. 2009a). Using diffusion data related to cell phones, cable 
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television and online banking in the US, Libai et al. (2009a) show that their service 
diffusion model is empirically appealing for the above service categories. The authors 
also illustrate that the following relationship among the parameters of their model holds: 
q(\-S)-p-S>0. 
To incorporate advertising into diffusion models of new products, Horsky and 
Simon (1983) consider the coefficient of innovation p to be a function of advertising 
whereas Simon and Sebastian (1987) consider the coefficient of imitation q to be a 
function of advertising. Dockner and Jorgensen (1988a), on the other hand, consider 
advertising to affect both of the coefficients p and q. Employing an advertising efficiency 
function h{U) of the properties h > 0, hv = h' > 0 and huu = h" < 0 and following the 
above literature, Table 4.1 analyzes three alternative diffusion model specifications of 
subscriber services. 




New Service Diffusion Model 
/ = ph(M -N) + q{\- S){N/M){M -N)-dN 
f=pM-(p + S)N+qh(\ - S)(N/M)(M-N) 
f=ph(M-N) + qh(l - S)(N/M)(M - N) - SN 
/N/U -ffuN 
p(h'/M) [q(l - S)(M-
N)2 - SM2 
- q(l - S)(h'/M) [p(M-
N)2 + SN2] 






p, q, M and £are constant parameters, and q(\ - 8) -p - S> 0 
In model Ml, advertising affects the coefficient of innovation. In model M2, 
advertising affects the coefficient of imitation. In model M3, advertising affects both of 
the above coefficients. Major investment decisions are typically made during the earliest 
phases of product/service launch (Parker, 1994, p. 364) for which//v > 0. Dockner and 
Jorgensen (1988a, p. 123) assert that for a diffusion model that includes advertising to be 
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theoretically plausible, whenever fN > 0 then fUN should be negative. The properties/^ > 0 
and fuN < 0 mean that the number of new subscribers increases with penetration N and 
such an increase is weaker for higher levels of advertising (diminishing returns' 
phenomenon). A review of Table 4.1 indicates that only model Ml is appealing on 
theoretical grounds (/UN < 0 at N = 0). In addition, models M2 and M3 are analytically 
intractable. As for such models, the first and second terms in (4.9) are of opposite signs. 
Therefore, model Ml will be the only model that will be considered for further analytical 
examination in this section. Its performance, however, will be empirically compared in 
the next section to models M2 and M3 together with the Bass (1969) model. The original 
Bass model does not incorporate marketing-mix variables and does not consider 
customers' disadoption. It is a special case of model (4.10) for which the disadoption rate 
S=0. 
Upon analyzing Expression (4.9) in conjunction with model Ml depicted in Table 
4.1, two propositions are introduced below for which the proofs are found in Appendix E. 
Proposition 3: 
For a low interest rate and the service diffusion model 
dN/dt = ph(M - N) + q(N/M)(M - N), optimal advertising decreases over time in the 
presence of a service cost learning curve. 
Proposition 3 implies that the optimal advertising policy is to advertise heavily 
when the service is introduced and then to reduce the level of advertising as the number 
of subscribers increases and the service moves through its life cycle. 
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Proposition 4: 
For a low interest rate, service diffusion model 
dN/dt = ph(M - N) + q(\ - S)(N/M)(M - N) - $V and presence of a service cost learning, 
optimal advertising is decreasing (or decreasing first then increasing later) for a 
penetration level Nsmaller or equal to (larger than) M[\-yJ5l{q(}-S)} ] . 
Proposition 4 implies that the optimal advertising policy of the service firm in the 
presence of customers' disadoption could be different from its counterpart in the absence 
of the same (Proposition 3). In the presence of disadoption, advertising could be 
increasing over time no sooner than the time corresponding to the level of penetration N 
specified in the above proposition. It is noted that the specified value for N in Proposition 
4 is positive as S< q{\ - S) by Table 4.1 footnote. This inequality is confirmed later 
empirically by the findings of Table 4.3. 
Empirical Analysis 
Description of Data 
Since the empirical analysis involves the estimation of several diffusion 
parameters, this required a comprehensive set of historical subscriber data along with 
advertising expenses. We were also interested in an industry where disadoption plays a 
significant role while the market is monopolistic at the same time. A plausible example of 
an industry with these attributes is cable TV. A cable TV service provider assumes a 
monopoly in the area in which it operates. It assembles selected cable channels into 
certain packages and makes them available to potential subscribers for a subscription fee. 
The selection of channels offered by a provider generally starts with a "basic" package 
for a fixed monthly charge. This package typically includes local and several distant 
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broadcast stations. The "premium" package such as HBO, Cinemax, etc. are offered as 
optional packages for additional monthly charges. However, since the subscriptions to 
these premium packages require subscription to the basic service first, the empirical 
analysis reported herein is confined to the basic service only. In addition to the 
availability of relevant data, basic cable TV service was chosen in the empirical analysis 
as it represents an example of a service innovation that comprises solely the line of 
business of each service provider and is acquired only once per household (subscriber). 
Aggregate annual data are available for Canada at the industry level (National and 
provincial) in terms of the number of subscribers (N,) and advertising expense ([/,). 
Following a similar mathematical approach as that employed in Mesak and Darrat 
(2003), it can be shown that if the consumer adoption process in each geographic area is 
represented by a Libai et al. (2009a) model, the consumer adoption process at the 
aggregate sub-national and national levels for the cable TV industry can be also 
represented by a Libai et al. (2009a) model. The data related to the cable industry in 
Canada and its provincial regions (Quebec, Ontario and Nova Scotia & New Brunswick) 
were available from Statistics Canada. The annual data related to Canada and its three 
provincial regions covered the period 1976-1994, and as the record indicated the data 
were available as early as 1976. In 1995, a change in the definition of number of 
subscribers affected the count of subscribers and therefore, data from 1995 and beyond 
were not comparable with previous periods. These data are provided in Appendix F. As 
the data indicate, new subscribers, n, = N, - N,.i, showed considerable variability over 
time. Such variability is important to distinguish between alternative model 
specifications. 
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Estimation and Model Selection Procedure 
The discrete analogues of the Bass (1969) model, obtained from (4.10) upon 
substituting S= 0, together with the modified Libai et al. (2009a) models Ml, M2 and 
M3 depicted in Table 4.1 are estimated and compared in this section. The models to be 
estimated take on the following forms: 
N, - yv,_, =p{M- N,_,) + g '
M - i V ' - ' ^ [Bass model]. (4.11) 
M 
Nr -yv,_, = p(M -yV,_,)\n{Ut) + q(\-Sy
M ~ N ' ~ l ^ ' - ' -&V,_, [ModelMl]. (4.12) 
N, - Nt_{ = pM -{p + S)Nt_l + q{\ - ^
M ~ ^ ' - ' ^ - ' \n(ui) [Model M2]. (4.13) 
N, - N,_! = p{M - Nt_{)\n{U,) + q(\~ Sy ~
 N,~l^"l Hu,)~^,-i [Model M3]. (4.14) 
In models (4.11) through (4.14), as in the study of Horsky and Simon (1983), an 
advertising efficiency function of the form h(Ut) = ln(Ut) is employed. The models (4.11) 
through (4.14) are nonlinear in the parameters p, q, M and 8. Although nonlinear 
estimation procedures could be employed, such procedures entail the identification of 
initial values for the parameters to be estimated that could be a problematic task given 
that such parameters are unknown to begin with (Venkatesan, Krishnan and Kumar, 
2004). Putsis and Srinivasan (2000, p. 267) mention that in practice, multiple runs from 
different starting values would be desirable. However, in many applications and for 
certain model specifications, it may be difficult or impossible to obtain convergence. 
Further, Van den Bulte and Lilien (1997) warn that nonlinear estimation procedures 
usually arrive at an estimate of market potential M that is close enough to the actual 
cumulative number of adopters at the end of the time series data of the diffusion process. 
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In this regard, Heeler and Hustad (1980) and Tigert and Farivar (1981) reported 
significant improvement in the quality of forecasting when using their diffusion model 
upon constraining the value of M to an intuitive estimate. In addition, Van den Bulte and 
Lilien (1997) suggest using an exogenous ceiling M to linearize the nonlinear regression 
equation to arrive at higher quality estimates of the parameters. 
Initially, SAS nonlinear estimation procedure MARQUARDT was used to 
estimate models (4.11) through (4.14) that are nonlinear in the parameters using the 
available data sets without much success. In several runs all the estimated parameters 
were statistically insignificant and in others the procedure failed to attain convergence. 
Therefore, models (4.11) through (4.14) were linearized through assigning plausible 
values for the market potential M to each of the regions in Canada. To estimate model 
(4.11) using multiple regression analysis, the following variables were defined: Yt = N,-
N,.i, Xlt = M - N,_] and X2l = (Nt-i/M) (M - N,.i). The estimates of the coefficients Xi and 
X2 provide the estimates for parameters p and q, respectively. 
To estimate model (4.12) using multiple regression analysis, the following 
variables were defined: Y, = N,- Nt.}, X„ = (M - Nt.i) ln(Ut), X2t = (Nt.,/M) (M - N,.,) and 
X3t = Nt-i. Accordingly, for model (4.12) parameter Sestimate was set as the negative of 
the estimated coefficient of X3, parameter q estimate was equated to the estimated 
coefficient of X2 divided by the estimate of (1 - S). Finally, parameter/? estimate was set 
equal to the estimated coefficient of Xj. 
To estimate model (4.13) using multiple regression analysis, the following 
variables were defined: Y, = N, - Nt.j, Xlt = N,.,, X2t = (M-//M) (M - N,.,) ln(Ut). The 
estimate of S was given by subtracting the estimate of p from negative the estimate of 
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coefficient X/. Finally, the estimate of q was obtained as the estimate of the coefficient of 
X2 divided by the estimate of (1 - S). 
To estimate model (4.14) using multiple regression analysis, the following 
variables were defined: Y, = N, - Nt.h X,t = (M - N,.,) ln(U,), X2t = {Nt.,/M) (M - #,./) 
ln(Ut) and X3, = Nt.j. The estimate of p was equated to the estimated coefficient of Xj. The 
estimate of q was obtained as the estimate of the coefficient of X2 divided by the estimate 
of (1 - 8). The estimate of £was given by the negative of the estimate of variable X3 
coefficient. 
The empirical literature suggests that a reasonable metric for judging rival models 
is their out-of-sample forecastability (Zanias, 1994; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). 
Bottomley and Fildes (1998) contend that goodness of fit raises issues regarding the 
robustness of the findings when models are estimated and "fitted" using much shorter 
data series as typifies new product/service forecasting applications. In addition, evidence 
in the literature (Rao, 1985; Young, 1993) demonstrates the lack of correlation between a 
model's fit and its forecasting performance. Therefore, the selection among models (4.11) 
through (4.14) is carried out according to a two-stage screening process. Only models of 
reasonable explanatory power (significance of at least one coefficient with the correct 
sign and insignificance of any coefficients with incorrect signs) are considered eligible 
candidates for the second stage. In the second stage, eligible models are compared based 
on their predictive power (measured by Theil's coefficient UII). 
In computing coefficient UII for a given model and a certain region, the related 
data set is partitioned into two parts. The first large part (13 observations) is used to 
estimate the model, whereas the second smaller part (5 observations) of the data set 
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(holdout sample) is used to compare actual with the out-of-sample predicted values. 
Using one-step ahead forecasting process, the model is first fitted for 13 observations 
using ordinary least squares (OLS), then a new subscriber forecast Y14 = N14 - N13 is 
obtained. The model is reestimated afterwards using 14 observations, and a forecast Y]5 = 
N15 - Nj4 is obtained and so on. Advertising during a certain year is used to obtain new 
subscribers' forecast for the same year, as appropriate. Coefficient UII (Theil, 1965, p. 






E A 2 
1/2 (4.15) 
where (A,, PRt) stand for a pair of an actual and predicted Y values for year /, and T 
represents the number of periods in the holdout sample (five years in this case). Finally, 
the selected service diffusion model is that eligible model with the smallest UII 
coefficient. 
Estimation Results 
The variables Nt, U, and the parameter M were operationalized as shown below. 
N, = Number of cable subscribers to the basic service by year t (in thousands). 
Ut = A/A 1, where A, is advertising expenditure of cable TV (in thousands of Canadian 
dollars) divided by consumer price index (CPI) in year t and Aj is the advertising 
expenditure of cable TV (in thousands of Canadian dollars) divided by CPI in the first 
year of a given time series, so that Ui = 1. 
M = Number of households wired for cable access in 2007 (in thousands). 
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After adding error terms to expressions (4.11) through (4.14), Tables 4.2 to 4.5 
summarize the estimation results upon using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method of 
the SPSS software package. 
















































Note: p-values are in parentheses. 
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Note: p-values are in parentheses. 
A review of Tables 4.2 - 4.5 reveals that model (4.14) does not pass the first stage 
of the proposed screening process for all regions as well as model (4.11) for the Ontario 
province. For model (4.14) in which advertising affects both of the coefficients of 
innovation and imitation, the coefficients q( 1 - S) and 8 are mostly significant with the 
incorrect signs. For the Bass model (4.11), the coefficients p and q, though having the 
correct signs, were not significant in the Ontario province. Based on the second stage of 
screening process, it is concluded that model (4.12) for which advertising affects the 
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coefficient of innovation p is best. The related UII coefficients are considerably smaller 
than their counterparts related to both models (4.11) and (4.13) with the exception of 
Quebec province where UII of model (4.13) was slightly smaller. This conclusion seems 
credible in view of the fact that the Durbin-Watson (DW) test could not reject the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residuals for all regions (at the 0.01 level, 
assuming that for the analyzed annual data errors follow a first-order auto-regressive 
model). Of course, absence of significant autocorrelation implies that the resultant t and F 
values are credible and there is no serious omission of variables from the model. 
Additional support for the reliability of model (4.12) estimates comes from Ramsey's 
RESET test of misspecification (see Maddala, 1988; Thursby, 1989) and White's (1980) 
test of Heteroskedasticity of the error terms. The above diagnostic test statistics are 
reported in Table 4.6. Other evidence of the adequacy of model (4.12) is that all 
regression coefficients appear with the theoretically expected signs, and each is 
statistically significant at better than the 0.05 level for all regions. Furthermore, SSE for 
model (4.12) is the smallest across all models and regions. 








































Because revenues in a given year are generated from the total number of 
subscribers N, Figures 4.1 - 4.4 depict the number of actual subscribers and their 
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predicted (fitted) values TV derived from model (4.12) for the different regions in Canada. 
In these figures, the fitted value TV, is given by actual N,.i plus the estimated Y, obtained 
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Figure 4.3. Actual and Fitted Number of Subscribers - Ontario. 
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Figure 4.4. Actual and Fitted Number of Subscribers - Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
Conclusion 
The models analytically and empirically investigated in this study characterize 
and validate the optimal advertising policy of a new subscriber service provider over 
time. The approach to modeling diffusion of a new subscriber service considers demand 
dynamics, learning curve and discounting that are managerially relevant. Demand 
dynamics are reflected in the differential equation of the diffusion model through 
incorporating innovation, word of mouth, market saturation and customers' disadoption 
effects. The learning curve, on the other hand, reflects dynamics on the cost side, whereas 
discounting illustrates management preference for money. 
The analytical findings of this study are summarized in Propositions 1 through 4. 
For a low interest rate such that advertising elasticity of demand is a non-increasing 
function of penetration, Propositions 1 and 3 argue in favor of advertising heavily at the 
-Actual 
• - - • - - -Fitted 
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beginning to build a large base of consumer adopters who keep on repurchasing the 
service upon their satisfaction with their initial experiences. Cost savings incurred due to 
service cost learning in one hand and positive word of mouth between initial adopters and 
those yet to adopt on the other hand lead to a reduction in the advertising level over time 
to enhance profitability. For a low interest rate and in the presence of customers' 
disadoption Proposition 4, unlike Proposition 3 where disadoption is absent, implies that 
the service provider may increase advertising later on, perhaps to regain back previous 
disadopters that remain to be inactive users of the service. When the interest rate is 
sufficiently high, Proposition 2 argues in favor of spending a low level of advertising by a 
myopic service provider at the beginning and increasing it monotonically over time as 
market acceptance of the new service industry becomes less uncertain. 
The empirical findings, based on data from a single service category (Cable TV in 
Canada), suggest that a modified version of a service diffusion model articulated by Libai 
et al. (2009a) that includes customers' disadoption in which advertising affects the 
coefficient of innovation (p) is best. In terms of both explanatory power as well as 
predictive power, the above model is found to be superior to the original Bass (1969) 
model for new consumer durables. The original Bass model does not consider customers' 
disadoption or marketing-mix variables. In addition, the above modified Libai et al. 
(2009a) model is found to be more appealing than two counterparts for which advertising 
affects the coefficient of imitation (q) only or both coefficients (p and q). 
Taken together, the analytical and empirical contributions highlighted above 
argue from a managerial point of view in favor of advertising more heavily during the 
early stage of the diffusion process of the new subscriber service innovation and the use 
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of a message that would predominantly target innovators. Furthermore, it might be 
inappropriate to model the diffusion of subscriber services as if they were durable goods. 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
Recent years have witnessed an increase of interest in managing the interface 
between the operations and marketing functions of the enterprise. Conflicts arise by 
nature between these two functions since, for a notable example, marketing wants to 
increase product diversity while manufacturing wants to reduce it through longer and 
stable production runs of a narrower product line (Shapiro, 1977). Consistent with the 
importance of managing the above said interface, the Journal of Operations Management 
published in 1991 and 2002 two special issues on the subject (Berry et al., 1991; 
Malhotra and Sharma, 2002). More recently, the Management Science journal published 
a special issue on the same subject in 2004 (Ho and Tang, 2004). Interdisciplinary 
research involving operations and/or marketing continues to be in demand. Recent calls 
for papers highlight the increasing interest in the subject. Examples are: A call for papers 
by Management Science for a special issue entitled "Marketing Within the Enterprise and 
Beyond" and another call for papers by the International Journal of Production 
Economics for a special issue entitled "Inter-disciplinary research in Operations 
Management." 
This dissertation is a collection of three research journals examining the interface 
between the marketing variable of advertising and some aspects of the operations 
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function of the enterprise, namely, (1) production cost [Chapter 2], (2) inventory control 
[Chapter 3], and (3) service cost learning [Chapter 4]. 
The objective of the first journal (Chapter 2) was to identify the optimum 
advertising allocation policy over time in the presence of a quadratic convex/concave 
production cost function. Recognizing a contradiction between the theoretical results 
(superiority of uniform policy under a concave advertising response function) and the 
empirical research findings (superiority of a pulsation policy) on the issue of whether a 
firm should advertise at a constant rate (uniform) or in a cyclic fashion (pulsation) in 
order to maximize its performance, the first journal attempted to reconcile the difference 
by incorporating a production cost function in the modeling effort. Through analytical 
proofs and numerical simulations, the results indicated the potential superiority of a 
pulsation policy in the presence of concavity in the advertising response function only if 
the production cost was in the form of a quadratic convex function; otherwise, the 
uniform policy would be optimal. The theoretical and numerical analysis employed a 
dynamic advertising response model (modified Vidale-Wolfe model of proven empirical 
validity) in a just-in-time environment of zero-inventory policy. 
The modeling effort developed in the first journal is exploratory, revealing many 
possibilities for future research. First, although most convex production cost functions 
analyzed in the literature assume a quadratic form (Eliashberg and Steinberg, 1993), it 
would be interesting and rather challenging to find out whether the results of the study 
remain applicable for any convex production cost function. Second, the study assumed 
price to be exogenous. Second, an engaging task would be to derive the optimal pricing 
and advertising policies in a unified framework. The review article by Gatignon (1993) 
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and the work of Lodish (1980) can provide guidance in developing research along the 
above direction. Third, the modeling effort in this study considered sales-advertising 
relationship to be deterministic and dealt with stationary markets for which the 
parameters of sales response are assumed to remain the same over different cycles. As 
mentioned in Mesak and Ellis (2009), relaxing these assumptions by introducing 
appropriate stochastic and non-stationary mechanisms would offer additional topics for 
future research. The papers by Horsky (1977) and Mesak (1985) offer guidance for 
research in the said direction. Fourth, the current study is confined to frequently 
purchased non-seasonal products for which advertising is the major element of the firm's 
marketing efforts. It would be interesting to examine seasonal products in future research. 
As indicated in Mesak and Ellis (2009), the problem may be analyzed for both 
infinite/finite planning horizons where the seasonality period is repeated infinitely (as in 
the case of toys)/finitely many times (as in the case of fashion clothing). The discussion 
in Jones (1999, p. 296) related to the advertising of seasonal products and the study of 
Favaretto et al. (1996) should be instructive in this regard. Finally, another plausible 
direction of future research would be to extend the modeling effort to incorporate 
competition for which advertising of each rival would affect market potential and/or its 
share of the market. The studies of Monahan (1987), Park and Hahn (1991), Villas-Boas 
(1993), Chintagunta and Vilcassim (1995), Dube et al. (2005) and Bass et al. (2005) 
would be instructive in developing this effort. 
The research objective pertaining to the second journal (Chapter 3) was to study 
how a firm would adapt optimum ordered quantity/production lot size and optimum 
advertising expenditure in response to changes in its own parameters, rivals' parameters, 
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or parameters that are common to all firms in a symmetric duopoly/oligopoly market. 
This was accomplished by developing comparative statics (sensitivity analysis) of a 
symmetric competitive inventory model with advertising-dependent demand based on a 
market share attraction model. Both optimum advertising expenditure and ordered 
quantity were found to be sensitive to changes in both marketing and operations 
parameters. The robustness of the symmetric comparative statics was validated by using 
data from the brewing industry in the US that represents an asymmetric oligopoly. The 
undertaken numerical and empirical analyses indicated that the theoretical results 
obtained for a symmetric oligopoly remained valid for an oligopoly where each firm had 
a market share less than 50% and the market shares were further apart from one another. 
Management of the enterprise would find the conclusions drawn from the research of 
significant appeal. Relaxing the assumption of symmetry would only complicate the 
analysis of an oligopolistic market without yielding much more insights. 
Beyond its theoretical contribution and empirical validity, the model offers a 
framework for further analytical and empirical research in the future. First, an immediate 
direction for future research would be to replicate the analysis for other industries (e.g., 
the ready-to-eat cereal market and the carbonated soft drink market) to assess the 
generality of the conclusions arrived at in this study. Second, the empirical data used in 
this study suggested a concave shape of the advertising attraction function. However, 
studies by Rao and Miller (1975) and Rao (1978) indicated that the response function 
may have a convex region which favors a pulsing advertising policy. Since the shape of 
the attraction function is important in the analysis, it is recommended that data of shorter 
duration be used to uncover the true shape of the advertising attraction function (see 
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Mesak, 2003, p. 1801 for a related discussion of this issue). Another possible extension 
when using data of shorter duration could be to include the influence of additional 
promotional activities that have a short-term effect, along with advertising that is 
envisioned to have a long-term impact. Third, the current study employed the basic EOQ 
model which can be extended to incorporate inflation into account. Studies by Aggarwal 
(1981) and Chandra and Bahner (1985) could be instructional in this regard. Another 
possible direction for future research could be to incorporate price-quantity discount in 
the modeling effort. Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) provide a lucid review on the 
subject. Finally, the study uses a static model. Future research may attempt deriving and 
validating comparative statics within a dynamic setting. However, considering the 
complexity of the analysis in a truly oligopolistic setting, simplification in the form of a 
symmetric competition, as done in this study, could make the analysis less difficult. Only 
recently, a progress has been made in symmetric dynamic advertising competition for 
oligopolies (see Erickson, 2009a for a notable example). Dynamic advertising 
competition in the past was mainly confined to a duopolistic structure (e.g. Erickson, 
1985; Chintagunta and Vilcassim, 1994). These recent developments, however, do not 
consider decision-making within the operations function of the enterprise. 
In the third journal (Chapter 4), the original Bass model was modified to 
incorporate advertising and customers' disadoption to characterize the optimum 
advertising policy over time for new subscriber service innovations where service cost 
follows a learning curve. After characterizing the optimal policy for a general diffusion 
model, the results pertaining to a specific diffusion model, for which advertising affects 
the coefficient of innovation, were reported. On the empirical side, four alternative 
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diffusion models were estimated, and their predictive powers, using a one-step-ahead 
forecasting procedure were compared. Empirical research findings based on data related 
to the diffusion of basic cable TV in Canada suggest that the specific diffusion model 
considered in this study is not only of theoretical appeal, but also of notable empirical 
relevance. Taken together, the analytical and empirical findings argue in favor of 
advertising more heavily during the early stage of the diffusion process of the new 
subscriber service innovation and a related message that would predominantly target 
innovators. Furthermore, it might be inappropriate to model the diffusion of subscriber 
services as if they were durable goods. 
The modeling effort developed in the third journal is amenable to further 
development in the future. First, the present study considers only the marketing variable 
of advertising. Other marketing-mix variables such as subscription fee/price (Mesak and 
Darrat, 2002) and quality (Rust, Zahorik and Keiningham, 1995) can also be considered. 
Optimal trajectories of such variables may be characterized through optimizing a proper 
measure of performance over the planning horizon, subject to the considered differential 
equations governing the service diffusion process. Second, this study assumed that each 
geographic area had only one service provider operating (as in the case of cable TV). An 
interesting direction for future research is to consider a situation in which two or more 
competing service providers operate (as in the case of cellular phones). Typically, 
competition is modeled in a (non-cooperative) game-theoretic framework. Service 
markets can take advantage from notions related to published new-product competitive 
diffusion models to modeling competition among new-service providers. Notable 
diffusion studies that consider advertising as the sole decision variable include Teng and 
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Thompson (1983), Horsky and Mate (1988), Dockner and Jorgensen (1992) and Nguyen 
and Shi (2006). Third, the empirical findings reported in the study were based on data 
from a single service category (Cable TV) in one country (Canada) for which data was 
readily available. An immediate direction for future empirical research is to investigate 
the role of advertising in the diffusion of other subscriber services in different countries 
to examine the robustness of the research findings of this study and to assess empirically 
alternative diffusion models of subscriber services that incorporate more than one 
marketing-mix variable. Fourth, the empirical work reported in this research is 
susceptible to further refinement and extension. For example, it was assumed in this work 
that the market potential M was stationary over time. This assumption could be relaxed 
by considering it as being dynamic and equals over time to the number of homes with at 
least one TV set. Examining the nature of the interaction between these two adoption 
processes would be of interest to academicians and marketing professionals alike. The 
empirical papers by Jones and Ritz (1991) and Mesak and Darrat (2003) should be 
informative in this respect. Fifth, the diffusion service models examined in this paper 
considered a single generation diffusion process, assumed to end by the saturation of 
market potential. The present modeling effort could be developed further to consider 
substitution with more advanced services technological generations. Examining the role 
of advertising in enhancing market potential by including new prospective adopters 
outside the old market potential and the substitution of old technology with a new one by 
current adopters (upgrading) is an interesting area for future research. The papers of 
Norton and Bass (1992), Mahajan and Muller (1996), Danaher et al. (2001) and 
Stremersch et al. (2010) should be enlightening in this respect. Finally, given that most of 
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the recent consumer innovations are either services (such as digital cable TV or instant 
messaging), or combined goods and services (such as cellular phones), it is disappointing 
to find out that empirical research on the impact of advertising on the diffusion of 
subscriber services to be lacking at best. The unavailability of advertising relevant data 
that goes along with related data on the diffusion of new subscriber services at a 
reasonable cost and/or collection effort is perhaps the main reason behind the current 
state of the art in this research domain. Therefore, the author shares Peres et al. (2010) 
assertion that more efforts should be made to collect necessary data to estimate 
alternative diffusion models of subscriber service innovations. The above article also 
provides additional plausible directions for future research that are closely related to the 
scope and purposes of this study. 
While research on managing the interface between marketing and operations is 
limited, the most common decision variable from the marketing side has been price, and 
the most common decision variable from the operations side has been the order quantity 
or production rate. By considering advertising as the main marketing variable, this 
dissertation aimed at partially filling the gap that exists in the literature by examining 
interfaces between the operations and advertising functions. 
APPENDIX A 
DERIVATION OF KEY FORMULAS IN CHAPTER 2 
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Appendix A derives expressions (2.10) and (2.11) in Chapter 2. The derivation of 
Expression (2.10) relies heavily on ideas introduced earlier in the works of Mesak and 
Darrat (1992) and Mesak and Ellis (2009). 
A.l. Derivation of expressions (2.10) and (2.11) 
A. 1.1. Sales revenue function 
Considering the general advertising pulsation policy for which 0 < x2 < xj, and 0 
< t] <T, the sales rate can be obtained by solving the differential Equation (2.3) in the 
following manner. Starting at t = 0, at which initial sales is So while advertising is kept at 
the level xj in the interval [0, t{\, sales rise exponentially with a growth rate (a +/(*/)) 
towards S(xi) and the related growth rate sales curve, gi(t), is given by: 
gl(t) = S0+{S(xl)-S0}(l-e-
(a+f(x'))t),0<t<thSo<S(x1), (A.I) 
reaching a peak M given by 
M = g,(f,) = V - ^ ^ ' 1 +S(xl)(l-e-
{a+f(x<))'<). (A.2) 
During interval [//, 7], advertising is at level 0 < X2 < xi and sales fall exponentially with 
a decay rate (a + f(x2)) from M towards S(x2). The related decay sales rate curve, gi(t), 
would be given by 
g2(t) = M -{M -S(x2))(l-e-
{a+f{x'M'-,')), t,<t<T,M> S(x2). (A.3) 
During the cycle n, the functions gin(t) and g2n(t) represent the sales growth and sales 
decay curve, respectively, while initial sales are represented by So,n during cycle n and Mn 
represents the sales peak in the cycle (see also Figure 2.4). Assuming the market is 
stationary, the quantities a and/(.) would maintain the same values over different cycles. 
Replacing So,n for So in (A.l) and So,n+i for g2(T) in (A.3), then through the use of 




1"'''+"2 iT"')] + S(x, )(l - e"0"'' )e~a> iT~''] + S(x2 )(l - e
a*(r"''>) (A.4) 
where 
oci = a +f(xi), 0C2 = a +f(x2), S(xi) = mf(x])/(X], and S(x2) = mf(x2)/(X2. 
Putting k = e-[a>h+a>{T-'<)],Q<k< l , a n d c = S(x,)(l-*-"''' ) e -
a ^ T - ' ) + Six^l-e^7-'"), 
Equation (A.4) can be rewritten as 
So,„+i = kS0,n + c. (A.5) 
It can be shown that a recursive expansion of (A.5) results in 
H - l 
So,n+i = k
nSo,i + c J V = knS0,i + c( 1 - *")/( 1 - k). (A.6) 
Taking the limit of (A.6) as n —> 00, noticing that 0 < k < 1, implies 
So = Lim n-,JS0,n+i = cl{ 1 -k), (A.7) 
so that 
_ 5 ( x , ) ( l - ^ " ) ^ ( r - " ' + ̂ (x2)(l-^^
)) 
3o _ 1 _ e - [ a , f , + « 2 ( r - f 1 ) ] • ^ - ^ 
Substituting for the value of So from (A.8) into (A.2), the limit M of the sequence {Mn} is 
obtained as 
_ 5 ( ^ ) ( l - g - g | t | ) e -
a A T ~ h ) +S(x2){l-e-
aAT-'<))e-°v< 
\-e ^
 = i .-[a,r1+a2(7--f,)] • (
A - 9 ) 
Substituting for g/f?) and ^ ( 0 from (A.l) and (A.3) in (2.7) in the text produces, after 
carrying out the integration and rearrangements of terms 
su.v. + s^xr-f,)- C^i C^^ (A.10) 
Substituting for the values of So and M from (A.8) and (A.9) produces the following 












Substituting for S(x,) - S0 and M - S(x2) from (A.l 1) and (A.12) in (A.10), the following 
Expression (A. 13) is obtained which is the same as Expression (2.10) in the text. 
T 
Six^+SixJiT-t^ + iSW-SixJ} 
( 1 1 Xl-e'^Xl-e-^7-"') 
\a2 a\ J 
U_e-^h+<>!2{T-ti)\ (A. 13) 
A. 1.2. Production cost function 
Similarly substituting for gi(t) and g2(t) from (A.l) and (A.3) in the second term of 
Expression (2.8) in the text produces, after carrying out the integration and 







(] _ p-"2 <
r- 'i)) h _ p-2a2Cr-'iA 
+ 2S(x2){M - S(x2)}±—
 1 + {M - S(x2)f ± >-
a. 2a, 
.(A. 14) 
Substituting for S(xj) - S0 and M - S(x2) from (A.l 1) and (A.12) in (A. 14), the following 




2(x2)(T -ti) + 2{S(xl)- S(x2)) 
rS(x2) S(x)
A 
V a2 or, i J 





a^T-,')f ( l - g - ^ )
2 ( l - g -




A.2. Equality of Expression (2.10) to the long-run mean sales rate 
The mean sales revenue related to cycle n, Rn, takes the same format as that of 








From (A. 10) and (A. 16), we obtain 
^ - ^ = ̂ k , - ^ o ) ( l - ^ l " ) / « 1 + ( ^ „ - ^ ) ( l - ^
2 ( r " " ) ) / « 2 ] - (A.17) 
Referring to Expression (A.2), we can write 
Mn-M=(S0,n-S0)e-
a>" 
Substituting for (Mn - M) from (A. 18) in (A. 17) produces 
(A. 18) 
Rn-R = ~{S0,n-S0)[{l-e-
a'")/«, + (l-*-«><r-''>)*-'• la2\. (A.19) 
But from (A.6) and (A.8), we can write 
i(s„,-s0)=i K O A I r C 
\-k n-\ 
0,1 \-k \-k 
= St 0,1 \-k (l-kf l-k Wo.i ^o / ' 
(A.20) 
and A: is a quantity less than 1, given by <?"
[a,'l+or2(r~',)] and S0 = cl(l-k) from (A.7). 
From (A.19) and (A.20), it turns out that LimH^ooO/n)^=|(tfn -R) = 0 as both 
the multipliers of (So,n - So) in (A.19) and the right-hand side of (A.20) are independent of 
n. Accordingly, Lim„_>o0(l/n)(^~ Rn J/n = R, and hence proving our assertion. 
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Appendix B provides the proofs to three results and two propositions in Chapter 
2. The proof of Result 2 is also found in Mesak and Darrat (1992) on pages 561 and 562. 
Proof of Result 1. 
Since for APP 
d{PRO) _ d{PRO) d{PRO) dxx 
dt, dt. 3x, dtx 
and PRO = yR - PC2 - x (Equation 2.12), we have 
d{PRO) _ dR d{PC) dx 
dtx dt\ dt{ dtx ' 
d{PRO) _ dR d{PC) dx 




dxx _ d \ xT I _ xT 
dtx dtt \ t{ J t] 
(B.4) 
For APP, as t\ —> T, we have xi = x, X2 = 0, S(xi) = S(x), Sfa) = 0, f{x2) = 0, #2 = «, and 
a, = a=a +f(x). Also defining/? = 1 — e-^''1+flr2 <7"~r'}, Equation (2.10) can be simplified 
as 








3r, ~ r 
S(x, )+{£(*,)} 
yCC2 OC] j 
p{(l - e~a'!')(- a2e-
a>(T~''))+ {a,e~a^ )(1 - e""2(r-''))} 
(B.6) 
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Noting that, p\ T =l-e (B.7) 
we obtain the following result upon minor arrangement of terms in (B.6) 
dR 1 






Similarly Equation (2.11) can be simplified as 
S\xx)tx 
PC2 = 1 
KT 
2S\x,){\-e-^)(l-e-*^) S\x{) 
, j ' a, p 2p2 
• + • 
a. a. 
(B.9) 
After rearrangement of terms and carrying out the differentiation, it can be shown that 












Similarly, carrying out the differentiation with respect to xt, it can be shown that 
expressions (B.5) and (B.9) take the following forms respectively: 
dR_ 
dx. 







After combining the results in expressions (B.2), (B.3), (B.4), (B.8), (B.10), (B. l l ) , and 
dx 
(B.12), noting that dx/dt, =dx/dx] = 0 a n d —
L 
dt. 
-x/Tfrom (B.4), Expression (B.l) 
d-»r 





yS(x)a 1 2S\x)a 






V ' J 
which can be rearranged into 
d(PRO) 
dt. r-






Substituting for S(x) = mf(x)l [a + f(x)], a - a + f(x) and after carrying out the 
differentiation of S(x) with respect to x, the following expression is obtained 
SO*-*(,)=, amf(X\, - 4 ( a + / ( * ' ) r W - { W / H (B.15) 
a (a + f(x)Y (a + f(x)Y 
After rearranging the terms in Expression (B.15) and incorporating it into Expression 
(B.14), we have 
d(PRO) 
dt 
1 f 2S(x)} 
— r 
TV K ) 
am 
ia + f(x)f 
\{f(x)-xf\x)}. (B.16) 









which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Considering Expression (B.17) since the first term of the right hand side is negative for x 
> xs and the second term of right hand side is positive for a concave advertising response 
function as well as for the concave portion of an S-shaped advertising response function 
in excess of Max {xh xs}, we arrive at the following conclusion about the left hand side: 




is negative, indicating that APP dominates UAP. Consider next an 
l,->T 
APP for which the policy parameter X - 0 and of t\ < T that dominates an UAP that costs 
the same for which the policy parameter X = 1. Assuming that the PRO path over the 
interval 0 < X < 1 of the same t/ and advertising budget x to be continuous and twice 
differentiable with respect to X, there must exist at least one APMP for which 0 < X < 1 
and close enough to X = 0 for which PRO is larger than that corresponding to the 
considered UAP. Hence APMP does also dominate UAP. The proof becomes complete 
by realizing that the above relationships are true for all feasible values of x and T. 
Proof of Result 2 
Adding and subtracting the term (aitj){a2 (T- ?/)}/{«/?/ + a2 (T- ti)} to and from the 
term (l - e~a''' )(l - e'aAT-u))l (l - e-^,+«2(7--r1)>) and substituting S(x,) = mf{x,)la, 
and S{x2) = mf{x2)loc2 in (2.10), it can be shown that R takes the following form: 
R = R, + R2, (B.18) 
m[f(xx)tx+f(x2)(T-t{)\ 
where R 
and * 2 = am J 1_ 
y OC2 OCx j 





It is shown next that Rj is a non-decreasing function of X = x2/x for /"(•) < 0. By 
expressing x? in terms of X and substituting in (2.13) for x2, xj can be expressed in terms 
of X also resulting in 
x2 = Xx,x, = (x/t,){T-X(T-t,)}. (B.21) 
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Since dRL = ^LdxL + ^LdxL^ ( B 2 2 ) 
dA dxt dA dx2 dA 
employing (B.22) in conjunction with (B.19) and (B.21) produces 
(B.23) 
dR, _amx(T-t])T[f'(x2)-f'(xi)] 
dA [/(x^+fix^iT-O + at]2' 
It is evident from (B.23) that dRi/dA should have the same sign as \f{x2) -f(xi)] which is 
> 0 for/"(-) < 0. Since R2 is non-positive from (B.20), then R2 attains its maximum at A = 
1 as for that value xi = xi = x so that ai = #2 resulting in R2 = 0. These results related to 
Ri and R2 imply from (B.18) that R attains its maximum at A = 1 so that RUAP > RAPP-
Since R is continuous in A, then there exists at least one 0 < A < 1 near A = 1 for which 
RAPP < RAPMP < RUAP-
The proof becomes complete by realizing that the relationship (B.24) is true for all 
feasible values of x, ti and T. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
For a concave advertising response function, dRj/dA > 0 by Result 2 and d(PC2)/dA > 0 
by Result 3. PRO = R + PC2 - x, so that d(PRO)/dA = dR/dA + d(PC2)/dA > 0. As for 
UAP, A = 1; for APMP, 0 < A < 1 and for APP, A =0, it turns out that for all feasible 
values x, t} and T, PROUAP > PROAPMP > PROApp implying that APMP dominates APP 
but is dominated by UAP. 
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Appendix C derives the fundamental equation of comparative statics in a 
monopoly in section CI. The proof to Proposition 1 in Chapter 3 is demonstrated in 
sections C2 and C3. Section C4 derives the steady state response of a modified Vidale-
Wolfe model. 
CI. Fundamental equation of comparative statics in a monopoly 
Define the profit function K = yD(x) - C(x) - 0- Ch - ^^- C()-F, (C. 1) 
^ \l 
where, 
x - advertising expenditure, 
Q - ordered quantity, 
C0 - ordering cost per order, 
Ch - inventory holding cost per unit held per unit time, 
C(x) - convex shaped advertising cost function such that C'(x) > 0 and C"(x) > 0, 
D(x) - demand as a function of advertising given by, 
m fix) 
D(x) = — , m is the market potential, f(x) is a concave attraction function such 
e + f(x) 
that f'(x) > 0 and f"(x) < 0, e is a constant parameter, and 
F - fixed cost of the firm. 
Defining n = n I ym, so that at optimal advertising x* and optimal ordered quantity Q* 
^ = 0 a n d ^ = 0. (C.2) 
dx dQ 
After substituting for D(x), Equation (C.l) can be rearranged to take on the following 
form: 
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n = fix) 




^ -Q- — 
ym 
(C.3) 
To study the sensitivity of x* and Q* to a change in one of the model parameters 0, 
Equation (C.2) are partially differentiated with respect to 0 then equated to zero 
afterwards to obtain 
a2n dx a2n ag a2n n 
+ — + = o dx2 de dxdQ de dxde 
a2n dx d2ndQ d2n n (C.4) 
dQdx 30 dQ2 d0 dQdO 
Here, it is assumed that all second partial derivatives of n with respect to each of the 
equilibrium values x* and Q* together with each of the shift parameters #do exist and are 



















Designating the 2 x 2 square matrix of the second-order partial derivatives in (C.5) by 









and the elements of matrix H are obtained by partially differentiating (C.3) in the 
following manner: 
ef an 
dx (e + f)
2 l - rQ 
c 






d2U d2Tl ef CG 
dxdQ dQdx (e + ff yQ2 










d2n 2 / C0 
dQ2 (e+f)yQ 
(CM) 
The following definitions are made for the derivations below: 
ef C0 
a = (e+ffrQ7 
(positive term) and (C.12) 
b = -r^{f(e + f)-2f'
2} 
YQ 
(negative term). (C.13) 
ym 











, where all four terms are negative (C.15) 
2bf Co 2 • 




(Note that the second order sufficiency conditions of optimality imply that -^-^ < 0, so cm 
dx2 
that from (C.8) 1 -
rQ 
>0and A>0) 
C2. Proof of proposition 1 
C2.1 Comparative statics of y 
Replacing dby y Equation (C.6) can be rewritten as 








A (e + ff 





Since every term is positive in the right-hand-side of Equation (C.17), it is concluded that 
, , dx , dO 
both — and — are positive, 
dy dy 
C2.2 Comparative statics of Ch 
Replacing #by Ch, Equation (C.6) is rewritten as 



















C2.3 Comparative statics ofm 















Since every term is positive in the right-hand-side of Equation (C.19), it is concluded that 
. . dx , dQ . . 
both — and — are positive, 
dm dm 
C2.4 Comparative statics of C0 
Replacing #by C0, Equation (C.6) is rewritten as 




~ A = T (e + f)rQ
3 
ef 1 




Carrying out the matrix multiplication, it can be shown that upon using (C.12) and (C.13) 
2 / C„ f ef 1 J 1 , af af dx _ 
5 Q ~ {e + f)rQ3\(e + f)27Q\* ' A{e + f)yQ2~ A{e + f)yQ2 
negative. 
dQ = 1 
dC„ A 
aef 1 + bf 1 
{e+ffrQ (e+f)rQ2 
Substituting for/' from (C.12) into the above expression, it can be shown after minor 
arrangement of terms that 
= ———(A - a2), so that becomes positive (negative) for A - a1 > (<)0. 
dCn 2AC
 V ' dCn 
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C2.5 Comparative statics of e 

















Carrying out the matrix multiplication produces 
dx_2f{f-e)f'r 
de A(e + fy YQ 
c af C0 
yQ3 A{e + f)2YQ2 
dQ_a(f-e)f'(l C / 
de A{e + ff { YQ + 
bf C0 
A{e + ffyQ2' 
(C21) 
Substituting for/' from (C.12) and b from (C.16) into the above expressions, it can be 
shown after minor arrangements of terms that 
dx af 




dQ = 1 yQ
2 
de 2eA(e + f) C0 
2a2(f-e)--*-{eA + a2(2f-e)} 
YQ 
d* • • • / • v* C0 , .2(f-e) , — is positive (negative) for —- < (>)— and 
de yQ 2f -e 
dQ . • • , • >n C0 , s 2a\f-e) 
is positive (negative) lor —- < (>) T-, r 
de yQ eA + a (2f-e) 
C C 
(Note from (C.8) that since 1 °- > 0, then 0 < —2- < 1) 
YQ YQ 
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C3.1 Comparative statics of fi and S 
Defining f(x) - fix8, 0 < S< 1, and replacing #by /?, Equation (C.6) takes the form 
dx 
dp _ l 
~ A 








(e + (3xs)2YQ2 













P{e + ffyQ2 
(C.22) 
Carrying out the matrix multiplication produces 
dx _2fe{e-f)f C0 




A/3(e + f)2yQ2 
dQ = ae(e-f)f 
dfi A0{e + ff yQ 
bef 
Ap(e + ffyQ2 
Substituting for/' from (C.12) and b from (C.16) into the above expressions, it can be 
shown after minor arrangements of terms that 
af dx 
dfi PA{e + f)2Q 
1 yQ2 






dx . . . . . , r Cn . . 2 ( / - e) 
— is positive (negative) lor —- < (>) and 
dp yQ 2 / - e 
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dQ • • • , • ,f C„ , ^ 2a\f-e) -^L is positive (negative) lor —- < (>) f- r. 
d/3 yQ eA + a (2f-e) 










e2fixs-l{\ + S\nx)+ej32x2S-l(\-Slnx) 
(e + j8xsJ 
ej3xs\nx C() 
(e + /3xs)27Q2 
7Q 











(e + fY 
eflnx Ctl 
{e+ffrQ2 
( c V 
I
 ° 
I rQ (C.23) 
Carrying out the matrix multiplication produces 
dx 2fef (e + f 
dd A{e + f)A I S 





dQ= aef \e + f 
dS A{e + ff\ S 
+ (e-f)\nx 1 
rQ 
aeflnx Cn 
A{e + ffrQ2 
beflnx C0 
A{e + ffrQ2' 
Substituting for/' from (C.12) and b from (C.16) into the above expressions, it can be 
shown after minor arrangements of terms that 
dx af 
dd A(e + ffQ 
'e + f + ( e - / ) ln*}-^{^i£ + (*-2/)ln. 
dQ = 1 yQ
2 
dd 2A{e + f) C0 
2a2\^J- + (e-f)lnx\-
C^_\2_a2ie±If_ A ) l n l 
rQ{ s J \ 
Therefore, 
9JC . . . , . , , Cn . . 2{(e + f)/S + (e-f)lnx] A 
— is positive (negative) for —^ < (>) —- — — and 
do yQ 2(e +f)/S + (e-2f)\nx 
dQ . .. , . ( , C0 , , 2a
2{(e + f)/S+(e-f)\nx} 
- ^ is positive (negative) for — -̂ < (>) —-.—- — — -— 
dd YQ 2a2(e + f)/S+(e-2f-eA)\nx 
C3.2 Comparative statics of d and e 















Carrying out the matrix multiplication, it can be shown that both 
2 / C0 dx 





dQ _ a 











2 / C„ 




-(l + flnx) 
0 
(C 
Carrying out the matrix multiplication, it can be shown that both 
dx _ 2f C0 
de A{e + f)yQ' 
dx' - i \ 
ym 





(l + elnx) => negative. 
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C4. Steady state response of a modified Vidale-Wolfe model 
The Vidale and Wolfe model (1957) takes the following form: 
— = j3x{m-S)-eS, (C.26) 
dt 
where 
dS/dt - the instantaneous change in the sales rate, 
S - the sales rate, 
x - the advertising rate, 
P~ the advertising effectiveness parameter, 
m - the market potential or saturation sales, and 
e - the decay constant. 
For the Vidale-Wolfe model, the advertising attraction function is linear and given 
by/(x) = fix and the market potential m is a constant quantity. Little (1979) proposed a 
modified version of the Vidale-Wolfe model for which fix) takes a power function of the 
form/(x) = fix , where fiand £are positive constants. 
The steady state sales response of the modified Vidale-Wolfe model is derived 
through setting dS/dt = 0, and solving Equation (C.26) for S to obtain 
S(x) = -?gfj. (C.27) 
e + fix 
Expression (C.27) is the same as Equation (3.1) in the text. 
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This appendix derives the fundamental equation of comparative statics in a 
duopoly in section Dl. The proof to Proposition 2 in Chapter 3 is demonstrated in section 
D2 and D3. Section D4 sheds light on the semi-definiteness of matrix H. Section D5 
derives the steady-state response of a modified Kimball model. 
Dl. Fundamental equation of comparative statics in a duopoly 
Define the profit function of firm j as 
xj=yjD(xJ)-C(xj)-^Chj—^COJ-FjJ=l,2. 
Designating fly = 7Tj I y^m, so that at optimality 
an, an, 
^ - 0 and -r-
J- = 0,foTJ = 1,2. dX; *Qj 
(D.l) 
(D.2) 
ax fix 1 
For a duopoly, demands D(x]) = —
! and D{x2) = m- D(xi), where m is the 
/(*,) + / (* 2 ) 
market potential and f{x{) and f(x2) are the attraction functions of firms 1 and 2, 
respectively. After substituting for D(xj),j =1 ,2 , Expression (C.3) for a monopoly is 
adapted to a duopoly as shown below 
n,= 
/ ( * ) 
/(*,) + /(*,) 
i - c " 
r,G, 
C(xx) Chl F\_ 




/(x,) + /(x2) 
l - c " 
Y2Q2 





To study the sensitivity of each Xj* and Qj*,j = 1, 2; to a change in one of the model 
parameters 9, Equations (D.2) are partially differentiated with respect to #to obtain 
a2n, a*, a2n, ag, a2n, dx2 a
2n, ae2 a
2n 
• + • + +- +-a < d$ dx,dQ, BO dxfix2 d0 dxxdQ2 30 dxfiO 
0 
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a2n, a*, ^ a2n, ae, ^ 32n, dx2 , 3
2n, a e 2 ^ a














ag2a;c, 30 3e23g, 30 3Q23X2 30 3Q\ 30 3Q230 
=0 (D.5) 
Here, it is also assumed that all second partial derivatives of Ft, with respect to each of the 
equilibrium values Xj* and Qj* together with each of the shift parameters #do exist and 




































L a<5» J 









3223x, d<22d<2, 3g23x, 
Designating the 4 x 4 square matrix of the second-order partial derivatives in (D.6) by 



















and the elements of matrix H are obtained by partially differentiating (D.3) and (D.4) in 
the following manner: 
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an, = f j ; L col 1 c[ 
fy (A+fifl YxQx\ ftm 
0, (D.8) 
i _ a 2n 






an, _ /, c„, cM 
3G. (/i + /2)r,G,
2 2r,m '"' 
52n, _ 2/, c„, 
a<2,2 (/, + /2)r,<2,3' 
a2n, _ /,'/;(/,-/2) 
3x,3x2 (fi+fif 
a2n, _ a2n, _ /2y 
[i C f " l 











a2n I _ / l / 2 ^ol 
3G,3x2 (fi+f2fr]Qy 
(D.15) 
an 2 _ J U 2 / , / ;
^2 ( / , + / 2 )
2 









{ / ' ( / l + / 2 ) - 2 / ; 2 } 






a n 1 = ^ Q 
d<22 A+fiTiQi
 2r2m 
2 r^2_ = o 
2 u ' 
(D.18) 
a2n2 = 2/2 co2 








2n2 /,/; c, ol 
dx2dQ2 dQ2dx2 {f,+f2)
2y2Q-




= 0, and 







Assuming a symmetric competition, the elements of matrix H can be simplified 
by putting/ = /} = f2, Q = Qj = Q2, and so forth. The following definitions are also made 
for the derivations below: 
4frQ2 
(positive term), and 
b=(f'f~f
n\ 

























Matrix H can be partitioned into four 2 x 2 matrices in the following manner. 
H 
Hu Hl2 






The inverse of matrix H (see Taha, 1992, p. 789 for details) is represented by the 

























(Note that Ai is positive per the second order sufficiency condition of optimality for firm 
2). 
Expression (D.29) takes on the following form: 





















a -a b 
A, 
(D.32) 
u J bCG 2 a
4 . a4 (A,-a2)(A.+a2) 
where determinant A, = ^ - a = A, = -^J '-^-^ 
rQ3 A, A, A, 
> 0. (D.33) 
(Note that A2 is positive since A\ - a > 0 per the requirements of the positive semi-
definiteness of matrix H. See subsection D.4 of Appendix D for details).It should be 
noted that all the terms in Hl' are negative. 
130 
Turning now to matrix//1 2 = - / / " . / / I 2 . / / 2 2 ' , then 









- i - i 
r<23 













It should be noted that all the terms in Z/12 are positive. 
Turning now to matrix H2] = - / / 2 2 ' . / / 2 1 . / / " , and using the results from (D.32) and (D.33), 
H21 takes the following form: 










= H 12 
-1 ww 21 Finally for matrix H = H22 - H Hl2H22, upon using the results obtained previously in 











































It should be noted that all terms of Expression (D.36) are negative. 
D2. Proof of proposition 2 
D2.1 Comparative statics of y 
Omitting the terms of H" which are not pertinent to the calculations and replacing 9by y, 

























After carrying out matrix multiplications, the following results are obtained: 
C, dx. 
dy A2yQ' 
f *> f'C0 , C'\ 1 
AfQ m r positive. 
3Q, = a 
dy A2 
( a2^ 
1 + — 
v A . y 
f r> >\ fc0 , c 
AfQ m 
positive. 
dx 2 _ a
1C„ ( f'C C'\ 1 
dy AxA2y& 
fC0 ,  
AfQ m r negative. 
abC„ 
dy AxA2yQ 
f r> >\ 
AfQ m r negative. 
D2.2 Comparative statics of CM 
Omitting the terms of H"1 which are not pertinent to the calculations and replacin 

















After carrying out matrix multiplications, the following results are obtained: 
dx{ 
acT" 
' a v 
V A 2 / 2ym 
negative. 
i _ 
( ,. ^ 




. 3 A 





f a2b V 
A,A2y 2ym 
positive 
D2.3 Comparative statics ofm 














. 2 \ 
1+-














































After carrying out matrix multiplications, the following results are obtained: 
d*i Co 
dm yQ'A, A. 






=> positive as ( A , - a
2 ) > 0 . 
3G, a 
dm A,A2 
A , + a 2 + - ^ -
V rG 
c b 
ym A, A, 
-(A,-a2} C„ 
2ym 
positive as (A, - a2) > 0 and 
2 fcC 
noting that A. + a + — ^ = 0 from (D.30). 1 re3 
3*2 Q 
dm yQ A,A2 
A 2 - a +-






, 4 \ 
A 2 « 
A 2 - a + — 




noting that A2 - a + — > 0 by (D.33). 
3(2: 
3m 
2 _ a abCt) 
~\+ A,A2yQ
3 
i - ^ 









can be rewritten 
using (D.33) as 
3ft 
3m 
q(A,+a 2 +Z>C 0 / r6
3 ) ' 
A, (A, + a 2 ) 
C / 
ym A, A l i J 2 
- 4 \ 
A 2 « 
A 2 - a + — 
v A i y 
2^m 
positive and 
fcC a noting from (D.33) that A, +a +—^ = 0and A 2 - a + — > 0 
YQ A , 
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D2.4 Comparative statics ofC0i 
Omitting the terms of H" which are not pertinent to the calculation and replacing #by 



























After carrying out matrix multiplications, the following results are obtained: 
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negative using (D.24). 
dCol Af yQ A2 
(A, - 2a2)>(<)0 by using expressions (D.24) and (D.30). 
positive {negative) for 
dx2 f 1 
aCol 4 / yQ 
a C 1 a j 1 « j 
IAAIYQ 2A,A2rG 
positive by (D.24). 
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2 2A,A2 re 
positive by (D.24). 
D3.7 Comparative statics of Pi and <?/ 
Define /(*•) = /?-x- J', 0 < 4 < 1. where, j = 1,2. Omitting the terms of H" which are 
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After carrying out matrix multiplications, the following results are obtained: 
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Similarly, omitting the terms of H" which are not pertinent to the calculations and 



















































Following similar steps as those employed to derive the comparative statics pertaining to 
fii, it can be shown that 
^ > 0 , ^ > 0 , ^ < 0 , ^ < 0 . 
dS) dS[ dSt dS{ 
D3.2 Comparative statics of d/ and £/ 
Define C(Xj) = d-x*'' , £j > 1, where, j = 1,2. Omitting the terms of H"1 which are not 
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positive (noting that b is negative). 
Similarly, omitting the terms of FT which are not pertinent to the calculations and 
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After carrying out matrix multiplications, the following results are obtained: 
d*i = Co I
 c 
d^ A2yQ?1 ym 
\n2e + - negative. 
3f, A 2 
/ 2 ^ 
v A . y 
C f 
j^ra 
ln z £ + - negative 
a2C„ C dx. 
dex AAiTQ { ym 
( 1 
ln z £ + -
v £j 
positive. 
dQ2 _ abC0 
dex A,A2yQ
3 I Ym 
In £ + - positive (noting that b is negative). 
D4. Negative semi-definiteness of matrix H 
This property of matrix H is instrumental in ensuring uniqueness of the solution 
related to the system of equations ——- - 0 , ——L = 0 , —^- - 0 , and -^-^- = 0 (Gruca et 
dx. aa dx. dQ2 
al., 1992). From the previous subsection matrix H for a symmetric duopoly takes on the 





















For matrix H to be negative semi-definite, the Ath principal minor determinant Ay of H 
would be either zero or has the sign of (-1)*, fc= 1, 2, 3, 4 (Taha, 1992, p. 789). For the 
above square matrix 
A,, =b<0, 
bCn 2 A22 = \-a = A, > 0, by the second order sufficiency condition of optimality of 
YQ 
firm 1 (or firm 2), 
• bA22 < 0, which is negative as b < 0 and A22 > 0, and A33=fc 
{ be. ^ 
YQ v / ^ J 
A 4 4 = " ^ ( A , _ " 2 ) -
For A44 to be > 0, A, - a2 should be > 0. 
D5. Steady state response of a modified Kimball model 
The Kimball model (1957) in a duopoly setting takes the following form: 
dS, dS^ _ L- 2- = Pxx,S2-P2x2Sx, (D.45) 
dt dt 
and 
Si + S2 = m, (D.46) 
where 
dS/dt - the instantaneous change in the sales rate of firm j,j =1 ,2 , 
Sj - the sales rate of firm 7,7 =1,2 , 
Xj - the advertising effectiveness parameter of firm7,7 =1 ,2 , and 
m - the market potential or saturation sales. 
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For the Kimball model, the advertising attraction function are linear and given by fj(xj) = 
fij Xj, j = 1,2, and the market potential m is a constant quantity. Little (1979) proposed a 
modified version of the Kimball model for which ffixj) takes a power function of the form 
fj(xj) = J3JXJJ , where fy and Sj are positive constants, j = 1,2. 
The steady state sales response of the modified Kimball model are derived 




£,(*,)= a / ' ' s and S2(x2) = m-S,(x1). (D.47) fix? +J32x? 
Expressions (D.47) are the same as Equation (3.5) in the text. 
APPENDIX E 
DERIVATION OF EXPRESSION (4.9) AND PROOFS 
OF PROPOSITIONS IN CHAPTER 4 
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This appendix derives Expression (4.9) in Chapter 4. Sections E2 through E5 
provide the proofs of four propositions. 
El. Derivation of Expression (4.9) 
The current value of Hamiltonian H is given by 
H=(P-QN-Ef-Q+Af = (P-C)N-Q+(A-E)f (E.l) 
The costate variable A satisfies the following condition: 
— = rX- — =rX- [P-C-NCN + (A-E)fN], A(T) = 0. (E.l) 
dt dN 
The necessary condition of optimality implies that, 
^J = (A-E)fu-Q' = 0. (E.3) 
From (E.3), 
O' 
A-E = -^->0. (E.4) 
Ju 
Given the properties off and Q depicted in the text, then A > 0. 
Differentiating Expression (E.3) with respect to time t produces 
d2H dU d2H dN d2H dA n / T ,C , 
T + + = 0. (E.5) 
at/2 dt dUdN dt dUdA dt 
Putting dN/dt =f, and substituting for dA/dt from (E.2) into (E.5) results, after minor 
arrangements of terms, in the following differential equation: 
dU2 dt dUdNf+dUdA{ dNJ' 
Furthermore, upon differentiating (E.3) using (E.4), the following quantities are obtained: 
fuu-Q"> (E.7) ^ = (A-E)fuu-Q" = 
\Ju J 
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which is negative as fuu < 0 and Q"> 0. 
d2H 
dUdN 
= U-E)fUN = 
yfu j 
fuN. and (E.8) 
d2H 
dUdA =fu > 0. 
(E.9) 






Based on (E.7) through (E.10), (E.6) takes on the final form 
-^^—^-(fNfu-fuNf)-fAP-C-NCN}+rZfu 
dU dt fu 
Expression (E.l 1) is the same as Equation (4.9) depicted in the text. 
E2. Proof of proposition I 
frr\ 










For < 0, fu fN - ffUN> 0. Putting r = 0 in (4.9), the sign of becomes negative 
dN dt 
as r^~Yis negative by (E.7), Q'> 0, Q"> 0,fu > 0 and P-C- NCN > 0 by assumptions. 
E3. Proof of proposition 2 
When r approaches oo, in (4.9) would have the same sign as the positive quantity 
dt 
rXfu since A > 0 from (E.4) and fu > 0. 
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d2H 
Noting the properties of/, Q, and C it can be deducted that in Expression (4.9), ^ < 0 
dU 
and fv{P-C-NC'} > 0. Therefore, in Expression (4.9), > 0, which completes the 
dt 
proof. 
E4. Proof of proposition 3 
Considering the specific diffusion model given by model Ml in main text 







Combining Expressions (E.13) through (E.16), it can be shown that 




When S= 0, Expression (E.17) takes the following form: 
fNfy - fmf = (M - NY , which is positive. Also noting that in Expression (4.9), 
——j< 0 and fu{P-C- NC'} > 0, so that for r = 0, < 0, which completes the proof. 
oU dt 
E5. Proof of proposition 4 
In the presence of a disadoption rate S, from Expression (E. 17): 
fNfu ~ Smf = ^f k
1 - S t M -N)2-SM2} which is positive for 
N<M 
q(lS) 
, resulting in < 0, in Expression (4.9) when r = 0 as 
dt 
{P-C-NCN}>0. For N>M 1-
q{\S) 
, however, fNfu -fmf becomes 
negative and could be positive for a sufficiently long planning horizon. 
dt 
APPENDIX F 
CABLE TV DIFFUSION DATA IN CANADA 
USED IN CHAPTER 4 
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The appendix depicts the annual diffusion data of basic cable TV analyzed in 
Chapter 4. The data cover the period 1976 - 1994 in Canada together with four of its 
provinces (Quebec, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick). The data for the last two 
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